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Categorical Exclusions from  
Capital Punishment 
HOW MANY WRONGS MAKE A RIGHT? 
Dora W. Klein† 
INTRODUCTION 
Plenty is wrong with capital punishment.  Even for 
people who support the death penalty in principle, many 
reasons exist to oppose the actual, real-world operation of this 
punishment.1  One well-noted problem is that defendants who 
are poor, or black, or whose victims were white, are 
disproportionately likely to be sentenced to death.2  
  
 † Assistant Professor, St. Mary’s University School of Law.  J.D., Vanderbilt 
University Law School; M.A. (Psychology), University of Pennsylvania; B.A., 
Swarthmore College.  For helpful comments and conversations, the author thanks 
Deborah Denno, Nancy King, Erik Knutsen, Charlene Luke, Thomas Main, Colin 
Marks, Greg Mitchell, Suzanna Sherry, Kent Syverud, Priya Travassos, Elizabeth 
Trujillo, and Judith Wise.  Responsibility for all errors is, of course, the author’s alone. 
 1 People who for pragmatic reasons oppose the death penalty comprise a 
growing segment of the abolitionist movement: 
A new group of abolitionists is emerging.  These new abolitionists are not 
particularly interested in the philosophical, theoretical, or theological debate 
about the propriety of capital punishment.  Rather, they have concluded that 
regardless of whether one believes that the government has the right to take 
life as an abstract matter, one cannot support the death penalty given the 
practical issues surrounding the unfairness and inaccuracy of its 
implementation. 
Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. LAW 573, 576 (2004); see also Louis D. Bilionis, The Unusualness of Capital 
Punishment, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601, 601 (2000) (noting that current “public criticism 
does not dwell on the morality of the death penalty as an abstract concept, but instead 
raises sharp questions about the fundamental justice of the death penalty as a real, 
operating social institution”).  
 2 The seminal article on indigent capital defendants’ attorneys is Stephen B. 
Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the 
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) (“Poor people accused of capital crimes 
are often defended by lawyers who lack the skills, resources, and commitment to 
handle such serious matters. . . . It is not the facts of the crime, but the quality of legal 
representation, that distinguishes this case, where the death penalty was imposed, 
from many similar cases, where it was not.” (footnotes omitted)).  For more recent 
scholarship on indigent defense, see Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense 
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Additionally, commentators have observed that appellate 
consideration of death sentences suffers from both too much 
emphasis on procedural rules and too little opportunity for 
meaningful review.3  Moreover, the Supreme Court has insisted 
  
Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 265 (2004) (“Year 
after year, in study after study, observers find remarkably poor defense lawyering that 
remains unchanged by this constitutional doctrine [established by Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)], 
and they point to lack of funding as the major obstacle to quality defense lawyering.”); 
Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent 
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1731 (2005) (“Many courts have been 
hesitant to acknowledge the ways in which the realities of indigent defense affect the 
assistance a defendant actually receives.”). 
  Concerning race and the death penalty, perhaps the most (in)famous 
consideration of this issue is the Supreme Court’s decision in McClesky v. Kemp.  481 
U.S. 279 (1987).  In this case, the Court accepted as valid several findings of “the 
Baldus study,” including that “defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 
times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks” 
and that “black defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other 
defendants.”  Id. at 287.  The Court nevertheless rejected McClesky’s equal protection 
claim because he failed to prove that “race was a factor in [his] particular case.”  Id. at 
308; see also David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An 
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983) 
(presenting the study’s full data).  For recent discussions of race and the death penalty, 
see David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of 
Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1411, 1423-26 (2004) (discussing race-of-defendant and race-of-victim effects); 
Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally Inappropriate Factors on 
Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990-1999, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 19-
25 (2005) (discussing the greater likelihood of receiving a death sentence for the 
murder of a white victim than for the murder of an African American or Hispanic 
victim); see also Nancy J. King, How Different is Death? Jury Sentencing in Capital and 
Non-Capital Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 204 (2004) (“There is 
considerable support for the claim that those who kill white victims are more likely to 
receive a death sentence than similarly situated murderers who kill non-white victims, 
although several studies suggest that the race of either the defendant or the victim 
may carry less significance for the jury’s sentencing decision than it does for the 
prosecutor’s charging and bargaining decisions.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death 
Penalty, 68 IND. L.J. 817, 818 (1993) (calling “misguided” the Supreme Court’s 
“jurisprudential choice to treat the Eighth Amendment as a ‘super due process clause,’ 
rather than as an invitation for the federal courts to review the merits of individual 
state-imposed death sentences” (footnote omitted)); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. 
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional 
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 403 (1995) [hereinafter 
Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts] (concluding that the Supreme Court’s death 
penalty decisions “have produced a complicated regulatory apparatus that achieves 
extremely modest goals with a maximum amount of political and legal discomfort”); 
Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital 
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 794 (2002) (“An array of 
procedural barriers to habeas corpus review has been crafted carefully, while basic 
questions of fairness and justice go unexamined.  Although it would be comforting to 
believe that habeas corpus and other court processes guard against unjust executions, 
the sad reality is that the review procedures in capital cases are unmoored by any 
enduring commitment to heightened scrutiny or careful deliberation.”). 
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that only “the worst of the worst” may be executed for their 
crimes,4 yet the Court has provided little guidance about what 
exactly ought to qualify someone for inclusion in this 
supposedly select group of death penalty-eligible offenders.5  
This failure to articulate any defining principles for the “worst 
of the worst” category of offenders has allowed legislatures to 
enact death penalty statutes that are so encompassing as to not 
really limit eligibility for this punishment at all.6  And in the 
past thirty years, the convictions of dozens of people on death 
row have been reversed,7 raising the distinct possibility that an 
  
 4 See Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2543 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(stating that “within the category of capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved 
for “the worst of the worst’” (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005))); 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (“Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who 
commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability 
makes them ‘the most deserving of execution’” (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 319 (2002))); see also Dean A. Strang, The Rhetoric of Death, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 
841, 853 (describing “the Court’s insistence” that capital sentencing schemes ensure 
that death “is reserved for the worst of the worst”); Penny J. White, Can Lightning 
Strike Twice? Obligations of State Courts After Pulley v. Harris, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
813, 866 (1999) (“[T]he Court assumed that by appropriately narrowing death 
eligibility . . . the death penalty could adequately be reserved for the ‘worst of the 
worst.’”); Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1599, 1604 n.40 (2001) (“Like the phrase ‘death is different,’ ‘the 
worst of the worst’ peppers death penalty literature.” (citing Irene Merker Rosenberg & 
Yale L. Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musings on “Eye for Eye” and the Death Penalty, 
1998 UTAH L. REV. 505, 524 (“The capital punishment schemes in this country purport 
to recognize that only the worst of the worst should receive the death penalty.”)). 
 5 See Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 
359, 409 n.256 (2001) (“The Supreme Court has not required significant narrowing and 
has not suggested that the narrowing must build on any particular substantive 
theory.”). 
 6 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The 
Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 391 (1998) (“The Supreme Court’s failure to require state 
legislatures and courts to develop clear lines has resulted in the modern arbitrary use 
of capital punishment.”); Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our 
Esteem: Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING 
STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE 82 (Austin Sarat ed., 
1999) (“[N]ew aggravating circumstances have been added to capital statutes, like 
Christmas tree ornaments.  These new factors reveal a process self-consciously freed 
from the dictates of substantive Supreme Court review.”); Steiker & Steiker, Sober 
Second Thoughts, supra note 3, at 373 (“[T]he Court has approved aggravating 
circumstances that arguably encompass every murder, such as Arizona’s circumstance 
that asks whether the defendant committed the offense in an ‘especially heinous, cruel 
or depraved manner’ and Idaho’s circumstance that asks whether ‘[b]y the murder, or 
circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for 
human life.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 7 See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 529 (2005) (reporting seventy-four 
exonerations of death-row prisoners between 1989 and 2003); Steven J. Mulroy, The 
Safety Net: Applying Coram Nobis Law to Prevent the Execution of the Innocent, 11 VA. 
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 3 (2003) (“Since 1973, 111 persons sentenced to death have been 
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innocent person might someday be—or might already have 
been—executed.8  
Given such wrongs, it is tempting to regard as right any 
court decision that limits capital punishment’s reach.  Less of a 
bad thing is, all else being equal, a good thing.  What if, 
however, a capital punishment-limiting decision possesses 
wrongs of its own?  Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Roper 
v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia, raise this very question.9  
Both decisions limit the death penalty—Roper excludes from 
this punishment offenders who committed their crimes before 
they were eighteen years old and Atkins excludes offenders who 
are mentally retarded.  But in both cases, the Supreme Court 
overstated the uniformity and universality of traits associated 
with diminished culpability among juvenile and mentally 
retarded offenders.10  Contrary to the impression the Court 
conveys in Atkins and Roper, not all offenders whom these 
decisions exclude from the death penalty are necessarily less 
culpable for their crimes than are the offenders who remain 
subject to this punishment. 
Do the wrongs of capital punishment nevertheless make 
the Court’s decisions in Atkins and Roper right?  This Article 
proposes that answering this question requires considering the 
implications not only for the offenders whom these decisions 
exclude from capital punishment but also for those offenders 
who are still included.  While Roper and Atkins quite clearly 
  
released because of factual innocence.” (footnote omitted)).  Additionally, the Death 
Penalty Information Center maintains a list of exonerations.  Death Penalty Info. Ctr., 
Innocence and the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php? 
did=412&scid=6 (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) (“Since 1973, 123 people in 25 states have 
been released from death row with evidence of their innocence.”). 
 8 This possibility, even more than any of the other problems, seems to be 
especially alarming for death penalty supporters.  For example, in 2000, Illinois 
Governor George Ryan imposed a moratorium on executions in part because of his 
state’s “troubling track record of exonerating more Death Row inmates than it has 
executed.”  Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Governor to Halt Executions, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 
30, 2000, at 1, cited in Stevenson, supra note 3, at 372 n.146; see also Samuel R. Gross, 
Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty—It’s Getting Personal, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1462 (1998) (citing evidence that “the risk of executing innocent 
defendants is important because it is persuasive to those who generally favor the death 
penalty”). 
 9 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002). 
 10 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (referring to “the diminished culpability of 
juveniles”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (“the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded 
offender”).  For a critique of the Court’s consideration of juvenile and mentally retarded 
offenders’ culpability, see infra Part I.A. 
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affect juvenile and mentally retarded offenders,11 that these 
decisions also affect non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded 
offenders is not so obvious.  This Article proposes, though, that 
Roper and Atkins do affect these still-included offenders, in 
ways that lend support to the adage about two wrongs not 
making a right.  As substantial as the wrongs of capital 
punishment are, they might not excuse the wrongs of 
categorical exclusions from capital punishment.12 
Part I begins with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Atkins and Roper.  The key problem in these 
decisions is the Court’s failure to recognize categorical 
exclusions’ implications for non-juvenile and non-mentally 
retarded offenders.13  Because not all offenders who after Atkins 
and Roper are ineligible for the death penalty are necessarily 
less culpable than those who may still be sentenced to death, 
the categorical exclusions allow for the unequally severe 
punishment of equally culpable offenders.14  These unequal 
sentences are unjust, and—because they are based on factors 
only imperfectly related to culpability—they are also 
arbitrary.15   
Additionally, in the twenty states that prior to Atkins 
and Roper had included juvenile and mentally retarded 
offenders among those who could be sentenced to death, the 
Court’s decisions might render the death sentences of non-
juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders more severe than 
those states’ legislatures had intended.16  These sentences 
might be more severe for two reasons.  First, had a legislature 
known when it enacted its death penalty scheme that not all 
offenders whom it considered potentially deserving of the death 
penalty could receive this sentence, it might have chosen to 
  
 11 The effect of Roper on juvenile offenders is easy to identify—after Roper, 
the death penalty is an unconstitutional punishment for crimes committed by those 
who are not yet eighteen years old.  Identifying the effect of Atkins on mentally 
retarded offenders is superficially as easy—after Atkins, the death penalty is an 
unconstitutional punishment for crimes committed by those who are mentally 
retarded.  But as is discussed in detail in Part I, determining whether an offender is 
mentally retarded is vastly harder than determining whether he is eighteen years old.  
See also infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 12 This caution is meant to apply only to categorical exclusions that are based 
on imperfect correlations with culpability.  See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying 
text.  
 13 See infra Part I.A. 
 14 See infra Part I.B.1. 
 15 See infra Part I.B.2. 
 16 See infra Part I.B.3. 
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enact a different scheme.17  And second, if only some offenders 
who deserve a punishment actually receive it, then the 
offenders who are punished are treated as more blameworthy 
than the legislature had considered them to be.18 
Part II discusses the effects of Atkins and Roper in the 
context of the broader capital punishment system.  Numerous 
scholars—and on occasion a few members of the Supreme 
Court as well—have noted the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
achieving both fairness in individual capital sentences and 
consistency among sentences.19  To the extent that categorical 
exclusions prevent the death penalty from being imposed when 
a juvenile or a mentally retarded offender is not so culpable as 
to deserve this punishment, the decisions in Atkins and Roper 
promote both of these capital-punishment sentencing goals.  
But by excluding from the death penalty even those juvenile 
and mentally retarded offenders who are as culpable as the 
non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders who may be 
sentenced to death, the decisions in Atkins and Roper allow 
unfairness in individual sentences and inconsistency across 
sentences.20  Moreover, because neither decision addresses even 
the possibility that categorical exclusions will diminish fairness 
and consistency, Atkins and Roper create a false sense that the 
justness of capital punishment has only been enhanced.  This 
Article concludes that although the many wrongs of capital 
punishment provide strong motivation for believing that the 
Atkins and Roper decisions are right, the rightness of these 
decisions becomes far from certain when the consequences for 
non-excluded offenders are considered.  Capital punishment 
after Atkins and Roper might appear to be more just, but this 
appearance might be misleading. 
I. THE MISSTEPS OF ATKINS AND ROPER 
A. From Imperfect Correlations to Categorical Exclusions 
In Atkins and Roper, the Supreme Court justified 
categorically excluding certain offenders from the death 
penalty on the basis of those offenders’ diminished culpability, 
yet defined the categories of offenders to be excluded—juvenile 
  
 17 See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 131-43 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra Part II. 
 20 See infra Part II.B. 
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and mentally retarded offenders—in terms of characteristics—
age and mental abilities—that are only imperfectly related to 
culpability.21  A person’s level of culpability for a given act is 
most directly a function of the mental state that accompanied 
the act, not of age or cognitive abilities.22  Certainly, age and 
  
 21 This Article assumes, without necessarily endorsing, the same culpability-
based, retributivist rationale for the death penalty as has the Supreme Court.  See 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984) (stating that retributivism is the 
“primary justification of the death penalty”); Richard S. Murphy, Comment, The 
Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in 
the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1303, 1333 (1988) (“[T]he Court’s approach to 
punishment, at least in the death penalty context, is essentially retributive despite 
protestations to the contrary.”); cf. Austin Sarat, Putting a Square Peg in a Round 
Hole: Victims, Retribution, and George Ryan’s Clemency, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1350 
(2004) (“Modern legality is founded on an effort to make reason triumph over emotion 
and to make punishments proportional in their severity to the crimes that occasion 
them.  Just deserts, not deterrence or rehabilitation, becomes the primary, if not the 
sole, norm governing punishment.” (footnotes omitted)). 
  This Article does not address either deterrence or incapacitation, the two 
other commonly invoked rationales for capital punishment, because whether an 
offender is mentally retarded or a juvenile cannot affect the legitimacy of either 
rationale.  If incapacitation is a legitimate reason to sentence anyone to death, then it 
is a legitimate reason to sentence a mentally retarded or juvenile offender to death—
the mentally retarded or juvenile offender will be just as incapacitated as any non-
mentally retarded or non-juvenile offender.  Similarly, if deterrence is a legitimate 
reason for sentencing a non-mentally retarded or non-juvenile offender to death, then it 
is a legitimate reason for sentencing a mentally retarded or juvenile offender to death.  
In Atkins and Roper, the Court argued that the deterability (or lack thereof) of 
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders supported categorically excluding them from 
capital punishment.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“As for deterrence, it 
is unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent 
effect on juveniles, as counsel for the petitioner acknowledged at oral argument.”); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319-20 (2002) (“Exempting the mentally retarded 
from [capital] punishment will not affect the ‘cold calculus that precedes the decision’ of 
other potential murderers.  Indeed, that sort of calculus is at the opposite end of the 
spectrum from behavior of mentally retarded offenders.” (citation omitted)).  But the 
Court’s arguments mostly miss the real point of the deterrence rationale, which is that 
the death penalty deters other people from committing crimes.  Thus the issue is not 
whether mentally retarded or juvenile offenders can be deterred but whether executing 
them can deter other people from committing crimes.  There seems to be no reason to 
believe that the deterrent effect (if any) of the death penalty on potential murderers is 
at all influenced by whether some of those who have received death sentences are 
mentally retarded or juvenile offenders.   
 22 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (“A critical facet of the 
individualized determination of culpability required in capital cases is the mental state 
with which the defendant commits the crime.  Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is 
the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the 
offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished.”); Larry Alexander, 
Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
931, 953 (2000) (“Criminal culpability is always a function of what the actor believes 
regarding the nature and consequences of his conduct and what the actor’s reasons are 
for acting as he does in light of those beliefs.”); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: 
The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 800 (1985) (“Both the law 
and lay judgments individuate an actor’s culpability according to the mental states 
that accompany actions.”). 
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cognitive abilities, along with many other aspects of a person’s 
background, might influence culpability, especially penalty-
phase culpability.23  What is difficult to determine, though, is 
the point at which these aspects actually, rather than merely 
potentially, influence culpability.  While capacity for culpability 
undoubtedly does tend to increase with both age and cognitive 
ability, at least up until a certain threshold, there is no single 
point on either the age or cognitive ability spectrum that 
divides all those who are capable of a particular level of 
culpability from all those who are not.24  Simply put, neither 
age nor mental ability correlates perfectly with capacity for 
culpability.   
In Roper, the Court seemed to recognize on some level 
the imperfect relationship between age and culpability,25 
acknowledging at least a theoretical possibility that some 
juvenile offenders might act with death penalty-level 
  
 23 See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What 
Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1562 (1998) (suggesting that in capital 
cases “‘remote’ reduced culpability . . . focuses on the defendant’s character.  It includes 
such things as abuse as a child and other deprivations that may have helped shape the 
defendant into the kind of person for whom a capital crime was a conceivable course of 
action.”); Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital 
Cases, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2590, 2622 n.134 (1996) (proposing that sentencing-phase 
jurors in capital cases should be instructed “to consider not only the circumstances 
surrounding the crime, but also aspects of the defendant’s character, background, and 
capabilities that bear on his culpability for the crime”). 
 24 See Donald N. Bersoff, The Differing Conceptions of Culpability in Law and 
Psychology, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 83, 91 (2004) (“IQ, after all, is not the factor that 
renders the imposition of the death penalty against those with mental retardation 
unjust.  Rather, IQ is a proxy, an imperfect one at that, for a combination of factors, 
such as maturity, judgment, and the capability of assessing the consequences of one’s 
conduct, that determines the relative culpability of a mentally retarded killer.”); 
Stephen J. Morse, Not So Hard (And Not So Special), After All: Comments On 
Zimring’s ‘The Hardest of the Hard Cases,’ 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 471, 484-85 (1999)  
(“Adolescents as a class may be more developmentally malleable or amenable to 
treatment than adults, but then amenability or malleability, not age, is the operative 
variable.”). 
  This lack of a perfect dividing point means that some juvenile and 
mentally retarded offenders will fall on the sufficiently culpable end of the culpability 
spectrum and also that some non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders will fall 
on the not sufficiently culpable end.  This Article focuses on the first group of offenders, 
because those in the second group already have an independently valid claim against a 
death sentence (the claim that they are not sufficiently culpable).  The concern in this 
Article is the effect that categorically excluding the first group will have on the 
sentences of yet a third group, those non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders 
who also fall on the sufficiently culpable end of the culpability spectrum. 
 25 Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (“The qualities that distinguish juveniles from 
adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.  By the same token, some under 
18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.”). 
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culpability.26  In Atkins, though, the Court seemed to declare 
that for cognitive ability, a perfect dividing point does exist, 
such that all people who fall on the mentally retarded end of 
the cognitive ability spectrum are incapable of acting with a 
level of culpability that might warrant capital punishment.27   
Two problems exist with this declaration that not a 
single person with mental retardation can commit a capital 
crime with the same level of culpability as someone without 
mental retardation.  First, it is not supported by the available 
mental retardation research, as a close look at the sources the 
Court cited in the Atkins decision reveals.28  Additionally, by 
failing to acknowledge the possibility that some mentally 
retarded offenders might act with death penalty-level 
culpability, the Court makes the task of administering a capital 
punishment system in a way that is both fair29 and consistent30 
seem simpler than it really is.  Categorical exclusions might 
solve the problem of improperly sentenced mentally retarded or 
juvenile offenders, but they raise other problems, problems 
that the Court in Roper failed to consider and that under 
Atkins, the Court could not possibly have considered because 
accepting the Court’s reasoning means denying that these 
problems even exist. 
1. Atkins v. Virginia 
In Atkins, the Supreme Court declared that for anyone 
who satisfies one of several commonly accepted clinical 
definitions of mental retardation,31 a death sentence is cruel 
  
 26 Id. at 572 (“Certainly it can be argued, although we by no means concede 
the point, that a rare case might arise in which a juvenile offender has sufficient 
psychological maturity, and at the same time demonstrates sufficient depravity, to 
merit a sentence of death.”). 
 27 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002) (“Those mentally retarded 
persons who meet the law’s requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried 
and punished when they commit crimes.  Because of their disabilities in areas of 
reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the 
level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.”); 
id. at 318 (“[The] deficiencies [of mentally retarded persons] do not warrant an 
exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.”). 
 28 See infra Part I.A.1. 
 29 Fairness refers to noncomparative justice—does a particular defendant 
deserve, in an absolute sense, the death penalty?  This concept is discussed in more 
detail infra note 127. 
 30 Consistency means that similarly culpable offenders receive similarly 
severe sentences.  See sources cited infra note 127. 
 31 It is curious that the Court adopted a clinical approach to defining the 
concept of mental retardedation, given that it has chosen not to define similar concepts, 
 
1220 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:4 
and unusual punishment.32  The Court based its decision on 
two conclusions: that a national consensus exists against 
sentencing mentally retarded offenders to death,33 and that 
people who are mentally retarded all possess certain 
psychological characteristics that render them incapable of 
acting with the same level of culpability as people who are not 
mentally retarded.34   
A discussion of whether the Court correctly assessed the 
national attitude regarding the death penalty for people who 
are mentally retarded is beyond this Article’s scope.35  But even 
  
such as insanity and competence to stand trial, in clinical, mental illness terms.  See 
GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 536 (8th ed. 2001) 
(“Insanity is a legal concept, not a psychiatric or psychological concept.”); Dora W. 
Klein, Note, Trial Rights and Psychotropic Drugs: The Case Against Administering 
Involuntary Medications to a Defendant During Trial, 55 VAND. L. REV. 165, 167 n.8 
(2002) (“Incompetence to stand trial is not synonymous with mental illness; a person 
can be mentally ill, yet still competent to stand trial.” (citing Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d 
466, 471-72 (5th Cir. 1968))); see also Lee, 406 F.2d at 471-72 (“One may be suffering 
from a mental disease . . . and simultaneously have a rational and factual 
understanding of court proceedings and be able to consult with a lawyer on a 
reasonably rational basis.” (citations omitted)). 
 32 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (concluding that execution of offenders who are 
mentally retarded is excessive). 
 33 Id. at 314 (discussing state legislatures). 
 34 Id. at 319-20 (discussing Court’s agreement with the legislative consensus 
because of the “deficiencies” of people who are mentally retarded). 
 35 In Atkins as well as Roper, dissenting opinions argued that this consensus 
was not so much a reality as a product of the Court’s clever counting.  See id. at 342 
(“The Court . . . miraculously extracts a ‘national consensus’ forbidding execution of the 
mentally retarded from the fact that 18 States—less than half (47%) of the 38 States 
that permit capital punishment (for whom the issue exists)—have very recently 
enacted legislation barring execution of the mentally retarded.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
By Roper, Justice Scalia was apoplectic over the counting issue: 
Consulting States that bar the death penalty concerning the necessity of 
making an exception to the penalty for offenders under 18 is rather like 
including old-order Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on the electric 
car. Of course they don’t like it, but that sheds no light whatever on the point 
at issue.  That 12 States favor no executions says something about consensus 
against the death penalty, but nothing—absolutely nothing—about consensus 
that offenders under 18 deserve special immunity from such a 
penalty. . . . The attempt by the Court to turn its remarkable minority 
consensus into a faux majority by counting Amishmen is an act of 
nomological desperation. 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 610-11 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
  But granting that some number of states prohibited the execution of 
juvenile and mentally retarded offenders, and also that even in states that did not 
expressly prohibit them such executions were uncommon, the question remains what 
kind of national consensus this evidence might establish.  Thus, even if the Court was 
correct that some kind of national consensus existed regarding the execution of juvenile 
and mentally retarded offenders, it is nonetheless still possible that the Court erred in 
concluding that a national consensus existed that juvenile and mentally retarded 
offenders are necessarily incapable of acting with the kind of culpability that would 
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assuming that the Court’s assessment of a national consensus 
against such punishment was correct, the Atkins decision is 
still troubling because of the Court’s assertions about the 
relationship between a diagnosis of mental retardation and the 
capacity for culpability.36 
a. Mental Retardation “By Definition” 
In explaining its decision to exclude all people with 
mental retardation from the death penalty, the Atkins Court 
asserted that “by definition [mentally retarded persons] have 
diminished capacities to understand and process information, 
to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from 
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, 
and to understand the reactions of others.”37  A diagnosis of 
mental retardation does not, however, “by definition” 
necessarily include impairments in the particular skills the 
Court listed.  Currently, the two most commonly used 
definitions of mental retardation are the definition adopted by 
the American Psychiatric Association38 and the definition 
adopted by the American Association of Mental Retardation.39  
  
justify the death penalty.  See Leading Cases, 116 HARV. L. REV. 200, 226-27 n.65 
(2002) (noting that in Atkins “the Court [did not] cite any legislative history supporting 
its view that the reduced culpability justification was the moral impetus for the state 
bans”). 
 36 Cf. Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Camel’s Nose Is in the 
Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery Slopes, 51 UCLA L. REV. 539, 579-80 n.107 (2003) 
(observing that “the underlying theory about why mental retardation is relevant in a 
criminal context is . . . vague”). 
 37 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
 38 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 49 (4th ed. text revision 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].  Under the APA 
definition, 
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage 
general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by 
significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following 
skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, 
use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, 
leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 
years (Criterion C).  
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3. 
 39 AM. ASS’N OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, 
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (10th ed. 2002) [hereinafter AAMR 
DEFINITION 2002].  Under the AAMR definition, mental retardation  “is a disability 
characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive 
behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.  This 
disability originates before age 18.”  Id.  The current AAMR definition differs 
somewhat from the AAMR definition that was in effect when the Supreme Court 
decided Atkins.  Under that definition, mental retardation “is characterized by 
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Although these two definitions differ slightly, both regard 
mental retardation as a syndrome characterized by three kinds 
of symptoms: subaverage intellectual functioning, limitations 
in some number of adaptive skills, and onset before 
adulthood.40  A person diagnosed with mental retardation 
might—but also might not—suffer from one or more of the 
specific “diminished capacities” on the Court’s list.  The only 
feature, though, that people with mental retardation 
necessarily have in common is that an examiner has concluded 
that each meets the criteria of some definition of mental 
retardation.  Contrary to the Atkins Court’s repeated 
references to “their impairments”41 and “their deficiencies,”42 
people who have been diagnosed with mental retardation do 
not uniformly exhibit any particular behavioral characteristics 
  
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related 
limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: 
communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, 
health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation 
manifests before age 18.”  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3. 
 40 As the Court summarized, “clinical definitions of mental retardation 
require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in 
adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became 
manifest before age 18.”  Id. at 318. 
  The Court seemed oddly untroubled about—or perhaps just unaware of—
the instability of these definitions.  But clinical definitions of mental retardation 
change rather often.  In 2002, following Atkins, the AAMR revised its diagnostic 
criteria, emphasizing consideration of deficits in adaptive behaviors.  Some changes 
have been more dramatic—in 1973, for example, the AAMR changed the definition of 
subaverage intelligence from an IQ score one standard deviation below the mean (85) 
to an IQ score two standard deviations below the mean (70).  See Sharon Landesman & 
Craig Ramey, Developmental Psychology and Mental Retardation: Integrating Scientific 
Principles with Treatment Practices, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 409, 409 (1989) (“What is well 
accepted within the field of mental retardation, but often viewed as surprising to those 
outside it, is that mental retardation is an arbitrarily defined diagnostic category, 
which has changed frequently and substantively over the years.”).  Moreover, 
definitions of mental retardation change not because of new scientific discoveries but 
because of new political values: 
The process of defining mental retardation is essentially an exercise in public 
policy.  There is no single God-given definition that scientists can discover 
and present as the “true” definition. . . . Prior to the new AAMR definition, 
scientists had already produced eight different AAMR definitions of mental 
retardation. . . . Each of the prior eight definitions had significant 
implications for people in terms of service models, stigmatization, and 
segregation.  The task of developing the ninth AAMR definition was 
essentially one of selecting from a range of possibilities the language and 
concepts that might serve as the cornerstone of today’s public policy. 
Steven Reiss, Issues in Defining Mental Retardation, 99 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 
1, 5 (1994) (discussing the next-to-the-most-recent change in the AAMR’s definition of 
mental retardation). 
 41 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306, 318, 320. 
 42 Id. at 305, 318. 
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or personality traits.  As the American Psychiatric Association 
stresses in its diagnostic manual, “No specific personality and 
behavioral features are uniquely associated with Mental 
Retardation.  Some individuals with Mental Retardation are 
passive, placid and dependent, whereas others can be 
aggressive and impulsive.”43 
b. The Atkins Court’s Sources 
The Court provides citations for two of its statements 
proposing that people diagnosed with mental retardation 
necessarily possess certain psychological traits.  In the first of 
these, the Court stated: “[B]y definition [mentally retarded 
persons] have diminished capacities to understand and process 
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and 
learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control 
impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.”44  The 
Court then cited two sources to support this statement: a book 
chapter discussing the evaluation of mentally retarded 
criminal defendants45 and an article summarizing the 
difficulties faced by mentally retarded criminal defendants.46   
The book chapter covers a wide range of topics, from 
“understanding mental retardation” to “the role of families, 
  
 43 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 44.  Steven Reiss, a professor of psychology 
and psychiatry at Ohio State University, similarly writes: 
Over the years, scientists have proposed various maladaptive traits to be 
characteristic of mental retardation.  These include cognitive rigidity, 
neuroticism, excessive attention seeking, and disassociation between verbal 
and motor systems.  Generally, researchers have failed to confirm theories 
holding that a specific trait is characteristic of all or most people with mental 
retardation.  Instead, researchers have found vast individual differences in 
behavior among persons with mental retardation. 
Steven Reiss, A Mindful Approach to Mental Retardation, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 65, 73 
(2000) (citations omitted); see also Alfred A Baumeister, Mental Retardation: Some 
Conceptions and Dilemmas, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 796, 797 (1987) (“[M]entally retarded 
subjects grouped homogeneously with respect to IQ exhibit significantly more between-
individual differences on various tasks than do similarly grouped nonretarded subjects.  
To add more complexity, retarded individuals typically show greater within-subject 
variability than nonhandicapped individuals.”). 
 44 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
 45 Id. at 318 n.23 (citing John J. McGee & Frank J. Menolascino, The 
Evaluation of Defendants with Mental Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, in 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARDATION 55, 58-60 (R. Conley, R. 
Luckasson & G. Bouthilet eds., 1992)).  
 46 Id. (citing Kenneth L. Appelbaum & Paul S. Appelbaum, Criminal-Justice 
Related Competencies in Defendants with Mental Retardation, 22 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
483, 487-89 (1994)). 
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guardians, and advocates.”47  The specific pages the Court 
referenced discuss three topics, each in a single paragraph: 
“cognition and decision making,” “cognition and social 
understanding,” and “cognition and moral reasoning.”48  Given 
the brief treatment of these topics, the superficiality of the 
discussion is not surprising.  For example, the authors state 
that “[i]ndividuals with mental retardation have rigid thought 
processes that lead to a difficulty or failure to learn from 
mistakes, resulting in counterproductive behaviors.”49  This 
statement, which is not supported by any citations, is followed 
by speculation—again unsupported—that “[p]ossible reasons 
for this rigidity and persistence center on a limited repertoire 
of social and communication skills.”50  At best, this source helps 
establish that mentally retarded defendants as a group tend to 
exhibit certain traits, such as limited communication skills or 
difficulty learning from mistakes.  While the chapter’s authors 
likely approve of the Atkins decision,51 the chapter itself fails to 
support the Atkins Court’s contention that “by definition” all 
people diagnosed with mental retardation possess these traits. 
The second source, an article published in an 
interdisciplinary law and psychiatry journal, similarly presents 
a general overview of the characteristics of people diagnosed 
with mental retardation.52  As a whole, the cited paper might 
serve as a useful introduction to or review of the varying 
competencies of people diagnosed with mental retardation, but 
it does not provide a basis for concluding that certain 
psychological traits of people who are mentally retarded are 
uniformly and universally different from the traits of people 
who are not mentally retarded.  The particular pages the 
  
 47 John J. McGee & Frank J. Menolascino, The Evaluation of Defendants with 
Mental Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
AND MENTAL RETARDATION 55, 58-60 (R. Conley, R. Luckasson, & G. Bouthilet eds., 
1992). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 58. 
 50 Id. 
 51 The chapter presents, for example, under a section headed 
“Recommendations,” in which the authors present what they describe as the “research 
and programmatic support systems [that] need to be initiated and established within 
the social fabric of the United States if justice is to be granted to persons with mental 
retardation,” the item, “Abolition of the death penalty as a politically symbolic act 
congruent with basic human rights and the highest expression of a culture of life.”  
McGee & Menolascino, supra note 47, at 71-72. 
 52 See Kenneth L. Appelbaum & Paul S. Appelbaum, Criminal-Justice-
Related Competencies in Defendants with Mental Retardation, 14 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
483, 487-89 (1994). 
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Atkins Court cited do include such statements as “Many 
persons with mental retardation have communication 
problems,”53 and “Some persons with mental retardation 
exhibit an increased tendency toward passivity or 
helplessness.”54  These statements’ qualifiers—”many,” 
“some”—implicitly contradict the Supreme Court’s contention 
that all people with mental retardation possess certain 
psychological or behavioral traits.  And while these statements 
are supported by citations, the sources that are cited present 
results that possess only limited generalizability.55  For 
example, the statement “Among people with mental 
retardation, appropriate responsiveness decreases as the 
complexity of the question increases,”56 is supported with a 
citation to a single study, which examined the extent to which 
subjects responded appropriately (defined as providing relevant 
but not necessarily truthful answers) to different kinds of 
questions (yes-no, multiple choice, and open-ended) posed by an 
examiner.57  This study found that “[r]etarded persons achieve 
moderate success in answering either-or questions” and “have 
their greatest difficulty with open-ended questions and with 
verbal multiple choice questions.”58  These results do support 
the study’s conclusion that framing questions in a certain way 
is likely to increase a mentally retarded person’s 
responsiveness in an interview setting.59  The results do not, 
however, support the Atkins Court’s contentions that people 
diagnosed with mental retardation necessarily have a 
diminished ability to communicate.  Indeed, even though in 
this study open-ended and verbal multiple choice questions 
produced the lowest mean percentage of appropriate responses, 
as compared to the other kinds of questions, mentally retarded 
adults responded appropriately to these kinds of questions 
more than fifty percent of the time.60  Moreover, all of the 
  
 53 Id. at 487. 
 54 Id. at 489. 
 55 This statement is not meant as a criticism of the paper or of the sources it 
cited, only of the Atkins Court’s use of the paper to support statements that are more 
general than warranted. 
 56 Appelbaum & Appelbaum, supra note 52, at 487. 
 57 Carol K. Sigelman, Jane L. Winer & Carol J. Shoenrock, The 
Responsiveness of Mentally Retarded Persons to Questions, 17 EDUC. & TRAINING 
MENTALLY RETARDED 120, 120-24 (1982), cited in Appelbaum & Appelbaum, supra 
note 52, at 499 n.30. 
 58 Sigelman, Winer & Shoenrock, supra note 57, at 123 
 59 Id. at 124. 
 60 Id. at 123. 
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study’s adult subjects were institutionalized and many were 
diagnosed with moderate or severe mental retardation,61 
suggesting that they were, as a group, far more impaired than 
anyone who is at all likely to be convicted of a capital crime.62   
The Atkins Court, in the second sentence devoted to 
supporting its position that certain psychological 
characteristics of people who are mentally retarded render 
them incapable of acting with death penalty-level culpability, 
stated: “[T]here is abundant evidence that [mentally retarded 
persons] often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a 
premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are 
followers rather than leaders.”63  In support of this statement, 
the Court cited four sources: a law review article64 and three 
articles from social science journals discussing three particular 
psychological characteristics—ego identity, self regulation, and 
competency to confess.65   
The law review article presents a thoughtful discussion 
of the difficulties that certain aspects of the criminal law often 
pose for defendants who are mentally retarded, especially as 
distinguished from the particular difficulties that defendants 
who are mentally ill often experience.66  The article also 
includes some general, although carefully qualified, statements 
  
 61 Id. at 121 (describing adult sample as consisting of “42 institutionalized 
adults in the severe to mild ranges of retardation”).  The sample subjects’ mean IQ was 
39.76 with a standard deviation of 13.12.  Id.  An IQ level of 35-40 defines the 
boundary between moderate and severe mental retardation.  See DSM-IV-TR, supra 
note 38, at 49. 
 62 Simply as a matter of statistics, most offenders are likely to be diagnosed 
with mild mental retardation, the level that “constitutes the largest segment (about 
85%) of those with the disorder.”  DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 43.  Moderate mental 
retardation “constitutes about 10% of the entire population of people with Mental 
Retardation,” while “[t]he group with Severe Mental Retardation constitutes 3%-4% of 
individuals with Mental Retardation.”  Id.  Additionally, all defendants with severe 
mental retardation and most with moderate mental retardation will likely be found 
incompetent to stand trial.  See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) 
(ruling that to be competent to stand trial, a defendant must have “sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” 
and must have “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him”). 
 63 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002). 
 64 James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal 
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 429 (1985). 
 65 Caroline Everington & Solomon M. Fulero, Competence to Confess: 
Measuring Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants with Mental Retardation, 
37 MENTAL RETARDATION 212, 212-13 (1999); Rachel Levy-Shiff, Peri Kedem & Zamira 
Sevillia, Ego Identity in Mentally Retarded Adolescents, 94 AM. J. MENTAL 
RETARDATION 541, 546-47 (1990); Thomas L. Whitman, Self-Regulation and Mental 
Retardation, 94 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 347, 360 (1990). 
 66 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 64. 
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about character traits that people who are mentally retarded 
often exhibit, statements such as “People with mental 
retardation are often described as impulsive or as having poor 
impulse control,” and “Studies on the moral development of 
people with mental retardation reveal that some individuals 
have incomplete or immature concepts of blameworthiness and 
causation.”67  Nowhere in this article, however, is there any 
statement asserting that all mentally retarded people possess 
any particular traits.   
The three social science articles similarly fail to support 
the contention that certain psychological characteristics are 
universally observed in people who are mentally retarded.  The 
paper on self-regulation reviews the literature on this trait for 
the purpose of proposing a comprehensive program to improve 
self-regulation among people with mental retardation.68  
Although the page that the Atkins Court cited does include 
such broad statements as “In summary, individuals with 
mental retardation have great difficulty regulating their own 
behavior,”69 the article earlier cautioned that “considerable 
research is needed to delineate the structure of the self-
regulation system among nonretarded and retarded persons.”70   
The study of ego identity found that among mentally 
retarded adolescents, as compared to non-mentally retarded 
adolescents and preadolescents, “[d]iffused identity was 
particularly evident in three areas: feelings of meaningfulness, 
physical self, and mastery,”71 while the study of competence to 
confess found that “significantly more persons with mental 
retardation than without mental retardation” both “did not 
meet minimum criteria for competence [to confess]” and “did 
not understand any of the substantive portions of the 
[Miranda] warning.”72  If in these studies all mentally retarded 
subjects demonstrated weaker ego identity or diminished 
competence to confess, such a result is not obvious from the 
published reports.73 
  
 67 Id. at 429.  These statements are preceded by the statement that 
“[m]entally retarded people are individuals. Any attempt to describe them as a group 
risks false stereotyping and therefore demands the greatest caution.”  Id. at 427. 
 68 Whitman, supra note 65. 
 69 Id. at 360. 
 70 Id. at 355. 
 71 Levy-Shiff, Kedem & Sevillia, supra note 65, at 545. 
 72 Everington & Fulero, supra note 65, at 216.   
 73 For example, while the study of ego identity reported significant 
differences between mentally retarded adolescents and the two comparison groups 
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In sum, all three social science sources as well as the 
law review article are consistent with the Atkins Court’s 
statement that people who are mentally retarded “often” act 
impulsively and at the direction of others.74  In this particular 
statement, though, the Court itself modifies its absolutist 
position that mentally retarded offenders “by definition” 
possess certain traits that make them less culpable than 
offenders who are not mentally retarded.75 
2. Roper v. Simmons 
As in Atkins, the Court in Roper explained its decision 
to adopt a categorical exclusion from eligibility for the death 
penalty—this time, for offenders who committed their crimes 
when they were not yet eighteen years old—as justified by two 
findings: that a national consensus exists against the death 
penalty for juveniles,76 and that juvenile offenders are less 
culpable for their actions than non-juvenile offenders.77  
Compared to the Atkins decision, with its assertions that 
mentally retarded offenders “by definition” possess certain 
personality traits that render them incapable of death penalty-
level culpability, the Court in Roper is somewhat better about 
qualifying its statements regarding juvenile offenders’ 
character traits.  For example, the Court stated that   
immaturity and irresponsibility are traits “found in youth more 
often than in adults.”78  The statements most clearly implying a 
recognition that not all people under the age of eighteen are 
  
(non-mentally retarded adolescents and preadolescents) on three measures of ego 
identity, significant differences were not observed on three other measures 
(commitment and purpose, social recognition, and genuineness).  Levy-Shiff, Kedem & 
Sevillia, supra note 65, at 546. 
 74 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
 75 For another discussion of the lack of fit between scientific research and the 
Court’s reasoning in Atkins, see Christopher L. Chauvin, Atkins v. Virginia: How 
Flawed Conclusions Convert Good Intentions Into Bad Law, 65 LA. L. REV. 473 (2004).  
The author, a law student at Louisiana State University, interviewed a clinical 
psychologist whose textbook was cited by the petitioners and who “suggests that it is 
‘patently false’ that either any of his, []or any of the widely respected scientific 
research, can lead one to conclude that a diagnosis of mental retardation necessitates a 
conclusion that the offenders[] is less culpable for his acts.”  Id. at 500-01 (citing 
interviews with Johnny L. Matson, Ph.D., Director of Clinical Training in Psychology, 
Louisiana State University, in Baton Rouge, LA (Sept. 2002-Nov. 2002)). 
 76 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
 77 Id. at 571 (“Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is 
evident that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with 
lesser force than to adults.”). 
 78 Id. at 569. 
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necessarily less culpable for their actions than people who are 
eighteen years old79 are found near the end of the opinion, 
where the Court resorted to the assertion that “a line must be 
drawn somewhere” to explain why it was adopting a categorical 
exclusion from capital punishment for sixteen- and seventeen-
year-old offenders but not for eighteen- or nineteen-year-old 
offenders.80 
Despite its apparent recognition that the correlation 
between age and culpability is less than perfect, the Roper 
Court did not acknowledge that categorically excluding 
juveniles from the death penalty might result in equally 
culpable offenders receiving unequally severe sentences.  Thus, 
even though the Roper opinion’s reasoning is an improvement 
over the reasoning in Atkins,81 both decisions fail to consider 
even the possibility that categorical exclusions will impact not 
only those offenders who are excluded from the death penalty 
but also those offenders who remain subject to this 
punishment.  
  
 79 The Court is not, however, consistent in maintaining this insight.  E.g., id. 
at 571 (referring to “the diminished culpability of juveniles” and the “characteristics 
that render juveniles less culpable than adults”). 
 80 Id. at 574.  The Court offers an unsatisfactory explanation of why line-
drawing is necessary.  Id. (“The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for 
many purposes between childhood and adulthood.  It is, we conclude, the age at which 
the line for death eligibility ought to rest.”).  Criminal sentencing—particularly death 
penalty sentencing—is supposed to be the ultimate in individualized assessment.  
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (“Given that the imposition of death by public 
authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the 
conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases.  The need for 
treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the 
uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases.”).  That 
governments draw lines for voting and marrying and other mass activities is not at all 
relevant to the question whether categorical rules should apply to eligibility for capital 
punishment. 
 81 The Roper Court’s sources, however, are perhaps no better than those in 
Atkins.  See Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379, 380 (2006) (“For such a deep and important opinion, Roper is 
far too scanty, vague, and dated in explaining how and why modern science justifies 
the legal distinction between juveniles and adults.”).  The difference in citation 
problems between Atkins and Roper is that while the Roper Court could have found 
better sources to support its claims that as a group juveniles are more likely than 
adults to possess certain character traits that influence culpability, sources simply do 
not exist that would support the Atkins Court’s claims about the necessarily 
diminished culpability of people who are mentally retarded. 
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B. From Categorical Exclusions to Problematic 
Punishments 
1. Unjust Punishments: Treating Like Cases Unalike 
The old Aristotelian principle still holds true: like cases are to be 
treated alike, and unlike cases unalike.82 
By excluding some offenders from the death penalty on 
the basis of criteria that are only imperfectly correlated with 
culpability, the categorical rules adopted in Atkins and Roper 
allow equally culpable offenders to receive unequally severe 
sentences.  For example, a person who breaks into a woman’s 
house, wraps her face in duct tape and binds her hands and 
feet with electrical cord, then tosses her off a bridge to drown83 
might receive a death sentence if he commits this crime a week 
after his eighteenth birthday, while a person who commits this 
same crime a week before his eighteenth birthday cannot 
receive the same sentence.84  Nothing the Roper Court said—or 
could have said—about juveniles, however, supports a 
conclusion that the not-quite eighteen-year-old cannot have 
acted with the same level of culpability as the just-barely 
eighteen-year-old.85  Thus, the just-barely eighteen-year-old 
  
 82 Margareth Etienne, Parity, Disparity, and Adversariality: First Principles 
of Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 309, 311 (2005).  More recently, Congress enacted the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines to achieve equality in sentencing.  See id. at 315 (“It has 
been said that the principal goal of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has been ‘to 
reduce unjustified disparities and so reach toward the evenhandedness and neutrality 
that are the distinguishing marks of any principled system of justice.’” (quoting Koon v. 
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996))); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution 
of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 825 n.234 (2006) (“The chief justification for 
the Guidelines was the elimination of unjustified sentencing disparity.”).  Although the 
Supreme Court recently declared unconstitutional on Sixth Amendment grounds the 
statutory provision making the Guidelines mandatory, the Court also preserved an 
advisory role for the Guidelines.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005) 
(ruling that as modified by the Court’s decision, the Federal Sentencing Act “makes the 
Guidelines effectively advisory.  It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines 
ranges, but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory 
concerns as well.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 83 These are the undisputed although abbreviated facts of Roper v. Simmons.  
543 U.S. 551, 556-57 (2005). 
 84 For a similar example, see generally Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of 
Line Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229 (1989). 
 85 David O. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile 
Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1584 
(2004) (“[A]ge is an imperfect proxy for maturity.  Even if maturation is reasonably 
regular, so that there is a significant correlation between age and maturity, there will 
be individual variance.  Some 16-year-olds will have as much normative competence as 
the normal 18-year-old, and some 16-year-olds will have as much normative 
competence as the normal 14-year-old.” (footnote omitted)).  According to Judge Posner, 
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who does receive a death sentence for this crime has a valid 
argument that so long as his actions were no more harmful and 
his mental state no more culpable, he should not be punished 
more severely than the not-quite eighteen-year-old.86 
The just-barely non-mentally retarded87 offender has the 
same argument.  For example, a person who abducts a man at 
gunpoint from a convenience store parking lot, forces him to 
drive to an ATM machine and withdraw money, then shoots 
him eight times88 might receive a death sentence for 
committing this murder if his score on an IQ test is 78 
(generally outside the range of a mental retardation diagnosis) 
while a person who scores 74 on an IQ test and is found to be 
mentally retarded cannot receive the same sentence.89    
  
The Justices in the [Roper] majority should not have relied on a psychological 
literature that they mistakenly believed showed that persons under eighteen 
are incapable of mature moral reflection.  One does not have to be a social 
scientist to know that such an inference cannot be correct.  Chronological age 
does not coincide with mental or emotional maturity; age eighteen is not an 
inflection point at which teenagers suddenly acquire an adult capacity for 
moral behavior.  The studies on which the Court relied acknowledge that 
their findings that sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds are less likely to make 
mature judgments than eighteen-year-olds are statistical rather than 
individual and do not support a categorical exclusion of sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds from the ranks of the mature. 
Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 31, 64-65 (2005). 
 86 STEPHEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE?: THE IMMORALITY OF 
PUNISHING BY DEATH 62 (2d ed. 2001) (“If death is arbitrarily imposed on only some 
who deserve it, while others equally deserving are treated more leniently, then those 
who are executed are treated unjustly, even if they deserved to die.”); see also Joseph L. 
Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 65, 
121 (noting though not necessarily endorsing the position “that even defendants who 
have committed aggravated capital crimes may properly claim injustice if they are 
given death sentences when others of equal or greater culpability receive prison 
terms”). 
 87 There is a diagnostic category for people who are not quite mentally 
retarded: Borderline Intellectual Functioning.  DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 740. 
(“This category can be used when the focus of clinical attention is associated with 
borderline intellectual functioning; that is, an IQ in the 71-84 range.”).  
 88 These facts are simplified from Atkins, in which the defendant admitted 
participating in the abduction and armed robbery but claimed that someone else was 
the triggerman.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307-08 (2002). 
 89 The DSM criteria for mild mental retardation specify an IQ score in the 
range of 55 to “approximately 70.”  DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 49.  Because of a five 
point margin of error for IQ tests, “it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation in 
individuals with IQ scores between 71 and 75 if they have significant deficits in 
adaptive behavior that meet the criteria for Mental Retardation.”  Id. at 48.   
  The Flynn effect complicates matters further.  This effect refers to the 
increase in IQ scores over time.  See Stephen J. Ceci, Matthew Scullin & Tomoe 
Kanaya, The Difficulty of Basing Death Penalty Eligibility on IQ Cutoff Scores for 
Mental Retardation, 13 ETHICS & BEHAV. 11, 12 (2003).  Specifically, this effect means 
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Although age is an imperfect marker for culpability, 
drawing the incapable-of-death-penalty-level-culpability line at 
seventeen years, three hundred and sixty four days old at least 
has the virtues, as compared to mental retardation as a marker 
for culpability, of simplicity and objectivity.  Like age, mental 
retardation is an imperfect marker for culpability, but unlike 
determining whether someone is or is not eighteen years old, 
determining whether someone is or is not mentally retarded 
involves a host of complex and subjective assessments. 
A diagnosis of mental retardation is based on three 
findings: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, almost 
always as measured by an IQ test;90 significantly impaired 
adaptive functioning in at least one (AAMR definition) or two 
(APA definition) areas of daily life;91 and manifestation of these 
impairments before adulthood.92  All three criteria require 
judgment calls on the part of the person making the 
assessment.   
Administering an IQ test involves literally hundreds of 
judgment calls.  For example, the IQ test most commonly 
administered to adults, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-
III (WAIS-III),93 consists of fourteen subtests, three of which 
(Comprehension, Similarities, and Vocabulary) require the 
examiner to score open-ended responses.  Thus, the examiner 
must decide whether to award zero, one, or two points to a 
response such as “For when it rains,” to a question such as 
  
that “the use of IQ norms based on a prior cohort of test-takers progressively inflates 
the IQ scores of subsequent cohorts of test-takers.”  Id.  Expert opinions differ as to 
how examiners should take the Flynn effect into account in individual cases.  Compare 
id. at 16 (arguing that “it is insufficient for courts to simply ask for an IQ score”), with 
I. Bruce Frumkin, Challenging Expert Testimony on Intelligence and Mental 
Retardation, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 51, 60 (2006) (“This is not to say that a psychologist 
should ‘adjust’ the IQ score to take into consideration the Flynn effect.”), and Jianjun 
Zhu & David S. Tulsky, Can IQ Gain Be Accurately Quantified by a Simple Difference 
Formula?, 88 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 1255, 1259-60 (1999) (suggesting that the 
Flynn effect should not cause examiners to adjust individual IQ scores). 
 90 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 49. 
 91 “Adaptive functioning refers to how effectively individuals cope with 
common life demands and how well they meet the standards of personal independence 
expected of someone in their particular age group, sociocultural background, and 
community setting.”  Id. at 42.  
 92 These three components are similar though not identical in the two most 
widely accepted approaches to diagnosing mental retardation; the DSM criteria and 
the AAMR criteria.  See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
 93 See ALAN S. KAUFMAN & ELIZABETH O. LICHTENBERGER, ESSENTIALS OF 
WAIS-III ASSESSMENT 4-5 (1999) [hereinafter KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, 
ESSENTIALS OF WAIS-III] (“Although many new instruments for measuring intellectual 
functioning have been developed in the past decade, the Wechsler scales are the most 
frequently used.”). 
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“What is an umbrella for?”94  What matters is not that the 
examiner award an objectively or normatively “correct” number 
of points but rather that the examiner award the same number 
of points as were awarded for similar responses when the test 
questions were normed; otherwise, the IQ score derived from 
the items will be invalid.95 
Adding to the difficulty of administering the WAIS-III is 
that seven of the subtests are timed (Arithmetic, Picture 
Completion, Picture Arrangement, Object Assembly, Digit 
Symbol-Coding, Symbol Search, and Block Design).96  The 
amount of time allotted for various tasks is measured in 
seconds (e.g., 120 seconds for Digit Symbol-Coding;97 for Picture 
Arrangement, 30 seconds for item one, 45 seconds for item two, 
60 seconds for items three and four, 90 seconds for items five 
and six, and 120 seconds for items seven through eleven98).  
Allowing someone a few additional seconds to copy symbols or 
complete a puzzle might add points to his IQ score.99  A 
textbook authored by two leading experts on intelligence 
testing stresses the importance of properly administering and 
scoring every item on the WAIS-III:  
Standardized administration and scoring means conducting an 
experiment with N=1 every time an examiner tests someone on an 
intelligence test.  For the results of this experiment to be 
meaningful, the experimenter-examiner must adhere precisely to the 
wording in the manual, give appropriate probes as defined in the 
  
 94 This is a real question from the WISC-R, the revised Wechsler IQ test for 
children, which was discussed in detail in a court opinion (the Psychological 
Corporation, which publishes the Wechsler tests, does not make test items available to 
the general public).  The court explained the official instructions for scoring responses 
to this question as:  
Two-point responses are: “Use it to keep the rain off . . . protects you when it 
rains . . . put it over your head when it rains . . . so you don’t get wet when it 
rains.”  One-point responses are: “Carry it when it rains . . . big round thing 
that can fold up . . . put it over your head . . . to keep off the sun . . . you hold 
it up (gives appropriate demonstration) . . . helps you if it starts 
raining . . . keeps you dry.” 
Parents in Action on Special Educ. v. Hannon, 506 F. Supp. 831, 844 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
 95 See infra text accompanying note 100; see also GARY GROTH-MARNAT, 
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 139 (4th ed. 2003) (“[T]here is a certain 
degree of subjectivity when scoring many of the items on [the] Comprehension, 
Similarities, and Vocabulary [subtests of the WAIS].  Thus, a ‘hard’ scorer may develop 
a somewhat lower score than an ‘easy’ scorer.”). 
 96 KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ESSENTIALS OF WAIS-III, supra note 93, at 
25. 
 97 Id. at 32. 
 98 Id. at 45. 
 99 See infra text accompanying note 100. 
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instructions, time each relevant response diligently, and score each 
item exactly the way comparable responses were scored during the 
normative procedures. . . . [I]t is vital for an examiner to follow the 
standardized procedures to the letter while administering the test; 
otherwise, the standard scores yielded for the person will be invalid 
and meaningless.100 
After all of the items on the individual subtests are 
administered and scored, these scores must be added, 
subtracted, and/or multiplied (depending on the subtest) to 
obtain raw scores for each subtest; the raw scores must then be 
converted to scaled scores; finally, the scaled scores must be 
converted to indexes, or IQ scores.101  Studies of not only 
graduate student trainees but also experienced Ph.D. 
examiners have reported scoring errors that resulted in huge 
variability—ten points or more—in obtained IQ scores.102 
Assessing the second diagnostic criterion, adaptive 
functioning, is not a simple endeavor either.103  Inclusion of 
adaptive functioning as a component of a mental retardation 
diagnosis was intended to balance the emphasis on the 
  
 100 ALAN S. KAUFMAN & ELIZABETH O. LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING 
ADOLESCENT AND ADULT INTELLIGENCE 20 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter KAUFMAN & 
LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE]; accord Alvin Enis House & Marjorie L. 
Lewis, Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale—Revised, in MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 326 (Charles S. Newmark ed., 1985)  (“It is difficult to 
stress this point strongly enough—a poorly administered instrument yields useless 
information.”). 
 101 KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ESSENTIALS OF WAIS-III, supra note 93, at 
60-61. 
 102 KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE, supra note 100, at 
198-99 (citing Joseph Ryan, Aurelio Prifitera, & Linda Powers, Scoring Reliability of 
the WAIS-R, 51 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 149 (1983)); see also GROTH-
MARNAT, supra note 95, at 143 (noting that “the number of administration and scoring 
errors on the part of trainees and experienced clinicians is far higher than [it] should 
be” (citations omitted)).  
 103 See Linda Knauss & Joshua Kutinsky, Into the Briar Patch: Ethical 
Dilemmas Facing Psychologists Following Atkins v. Virginia, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 121, 
122 (2004) (“Determinations regarding adaptive functioning are often subjective and 
left largely to the clinical judgment of mental health professionals.” (citing AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 39-40 (4th ed. 1994))).  State courts are increasingly expressing frustration 
with the subjectivity of evaluating adaptive functioning.  See, e.g., State v. Burke, No. 
04AP-12342005, 2005 WL 3557641, at *8 (Ohio App. Dec. 30, 2005) (“Although experts 
offer insightful opinions, the adaptive behavior criteria are subjective, and experts will 
offer opinions on both sides of the issue.”); Ex parte Rodriguez, 164 S.W.3d 400, 405-06 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (Cochran, J., concurring) (“As experts on both sides in this case 
testified, there are no objectively verifiable standards by which to gauge whether a 
specific person does or does not suffer the kind of significant ‘adaptive deficits’ that a 
diagnosis of mental retardation requires.”); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2004) (“The adaptive behavior criteria are exceedingly subjective, and 
undoubtedly experts will be found to offer opinions on both sides of the issue in most 
cases.”). 
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academic kinds of intelligence measured by IQ tests with a 
different, practical kind of intelligence.104  Historically, 
examiners have assessed adaptive functioning on the 
inherently subjective bases of interviews, observations, and 
professional judgment.105  Recently, researchers have developed 
a number of test instruments for quantifying adaptive 
functioning.106  These instruments, however, can be less than 
ideal for assessing adult criminal defendants who might be 
mentally retarded.  The first problem is that most of these 
instruments require the availability of at least one caregiver, or 
other reliable independent source, to provide information.107  
Additionally, the particular populations that were used to 
develop a test’s norms determine the general usefulness of that 
test; the norms for one widely used test, the Vineland Adaptive 
Behavior Scales, were developed with juveniles,108 while the 
  
 104 See AAMR DEFINITION 2002, supra note 39, at 24 (“The addition of 
adaptive behavior limitations as a criterion for diagnosing mental retardation was 
intended to better reflect the social characteristics of the disability, to reduce reliance 
on IQ scores, and to decrease the number of ‘false positives,’ or individuals falsely 
identified as having mental retardation.”); see also Stephen Greenspan, What Is Meant 
by Mental Retardation?, 11 INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 6, 14 (1999) (noting that the term 
“adaptive behaviour” was “invented by the AAMR for use in its dual criteria definition 
of [mental retardation]”). 
 105 Reiss, supra note 40, at 4, cited in Note, Implementing Atkins, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 2565, 2575 (2003) [hereinafter Implementing Atkins]. 
 106 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 42.  Two popular tests are the Vineland 
Adaptive Behavior Scales, which includes questions about communication, daily living 
skills, socialization, and motor skills, and the American Association on Mental 
Retardation Adaptive Behavior Scale, which includes items measuring personal self-
sufficiency, community self-sufficiency, personal-social responsibility, and social 
adjustment.  Id. 
 107 This is a general problem with assessing adaptive functioning.  See DSM-
IV-TR, supra note 38, at 42 (“It is useful to gather evidence for deficits in adaptive 
functioning from one or more reliable independent sources (e.g., teacher evaluation and 
educational, developmental, and medical history).”).  Some instruments require that 
the information come from someone other than the person being assessed.  Frumkin, 
supra note 89, at 57 (“The most common mistake forensic clinicians make in these 
[adaptive functioning] assessments is to evaluate adaptive functioning by giving the 
Vineland or [Adaptive Behavior Scales] tests to the defendant rather than to a family 
member or individual who knows the defendant well.  Such administration procedures 
invalidate the testing for a variety [of] reasons in addition to violating the instructions 
for test administration contained in the tests’ manuals.”). 
 108 See Nigel Beail, Utility of the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales in 
Diagnosis and Research with Adults Who Have Mental Retardation, 41 MENTAL 
RETARDATION 286, 286 (2003) (stating that for the 1984 Vineland, “[t]he 
standardization of the instrument was conducted with a sample of 3,000 individuals 
from birth to 18 years 11 months who were selected across the United States according 
to demographic information from the 1980 Census”); id. at 287 (“The Vineland has 
some major psychometric deficiencies when used with adults who have mental 
retardation.”).  According to Pearson Assessments, which publishes the Vineland, a 
second edition of this test, with an expanded age range, was introduced in 2006.  See 
Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, Second Edition (Vineland II), 
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norms for the AAMR’s Adaptive Behavior Scales were based 
only on adults diagnosed with developmental disabilities.109  
Finally, because adaptive functioning is context-dependent,110 
assessment can be especially difficult when a person has been 
living in an atypical environment such as a prison.111 
The final diagnostic criterion—that impairments in 
intelligence and adaptive functioning must be evident before 
age eighteen—also presents problems when someone is 
evaluated for the first time as an adult.  The primary difficulty 
is that the examiner might be unable to determine, because of 
missing school records or the absence of family members, 
whether any present impairments began in childhood.112  
Because of the layers of complexity and subjectivity 
involved in diagnosing mental retardation, using mental 
retardation as a marker for culpability creates perhaps an even 
greater risk of producing unequal sentences for equal 
  
http://ags.pearsonassessments.com/group.asp?nGroupInfoID=aVineland (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2007).  Whether this new version adequately resolves the old version’s 
psychometric problems, without introducing additional problems, remains to be 
investigated. 
 109 AAMR DEFINITION 2002, supra note 39, at 89 (noting that the Residential 
and Community version of the AAMR Adaptive Behavior Scales “was developed to be 
appropriate for individuals through 79 years of age, but norms are not available for 
adults with typical functioning”).  The only other version of the Adaptive Behavior 
Scales, the School and Community version, is unsuitable for assessing adults because it 
“provides norms through age 21 and includes items appropriate for school settings that 
may not be related to adult environments.”  Id. 
 110 Id. at 8 (“Limitations in present functioning must be considered within the 
context of community environments typical of the individual’s age peers and culture.”); 
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 38, at 42 (noting that “behaviors that would normally be 
considered maladaptive (e.g., dependency, passivity) may be evidence of good 
adaptation in the context of a particular individual’s life (e.g., in some institutional 
settings)”). 
 111 See Stanley L. Brodsky & Virginia A. Galloway, Ethical and Professional 
Demands for Forensic Mental Health Professionals in the Post-Atkins Era, 13 ETHICS & 
BEHAV. 3, 7 (2003) (“Our inquiries into what evaluators from institutions for the 
retarded would use with someone who has been in jail or prison for many years or on 
death row indicated that an assessment of adaptive functioning would be difficult.”); 
Caroline Everington & Denis W. Keyes, Diagnosing Mental Retardation in Criminal 
Proceedings: The Critical Importance of Documenting Adaptive Behavior, 8 FORENSIC 
EXAMINER 31, 33 (1999) (“In situations of prolonged incarcerations, neither 
standardized instruments nor informal questionnaires are appropriate as the 
individual has no opportunity to perform in most of the skill domains.”); see also Robert 
H. Bruininks et al., Adaptive Behavior and Mental Retardation, 21 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 
69, 77-80 (1987) (discussing the effect of environment on adaptive behavior), cited in 
Implementing Atkins, supra note 105, at 2576. 
 112 Cf. John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the Forensic 
Psychologist, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 73, 114 (2003) (“Objective adaptive functioning 
assessment instruments may not be available in the defendant’s past records and it 
may be difficult to assess current adaptive functioning due to inability to contact family 
members and friends and obtain relevant information.”). 
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culpability than does using age as a marker.  An offender who 
obtains an accurate IQ score placing him just outside the range 
of mental retardation—while another, no less culpable offender 
obtains a slightly lower score, one that is within the mentally 
retarded range, because the examiner who administered the IQ 
test misscored a few items or miscalculated a few scales, for 
example—has a valid argument that in neither case should a 
mental retardation diagnosis be grounds for either allowing or 
not allowing the jury to impose the death penalty.  Moreover, 
even if the second offender’s lower score were accurate, and he 
really did meet the criteria for a diagnosis of mental 
retardation, the first offender—the one who really did not meet 
the criteria for a diagnosis of mental retardation—would still 
have a valid argument that although his greater mental ability 
makes him more likely to be more culpable, he should not be 
punished more severely unless he actually is more culpable.113   
In sum, the categorical exclusions adopted in Atkins and 
Roper affect not only the juvenile and mentally retarded 
offenders who cannot receive a sentence of death but also the 
non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders who remain 
subject to capital punishment.  The decisions in Atkins and 
Roper leave those offenders who are not excluded from capital 
punishment with a valid argument that their death sentences 
are unjust because like cases are not being treated alike.114   
2. Arbitrary Punishments: “Not Based on the Nature of 
Things” 
In the Oxford English Dictionary, among the definitions 
of “arbitrary” is the entry “not based on the nature of things.”115  
When a death sentence is avoided (or not avoided) solely 
because of age or mental ability, the punishment is arbitrary; 
  
 113 See supra note 86. 
 114 Of course, perfect equality in sentencing is not attainable, nor is it 
contitutionally required.  See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984) (“Any capital 
sentencing scheme may occasionally produce aberrational outcomes.”).  However, the 
kind of inequality invited by Atkins and Roper should not be tolerated.  It is one thing 
to accept that aberrations might occassionally occur; it is quite another thing to adopt a 
sentencing scheme that systematically excludes from capital punishment offenders who 
are not necessarily any less culpable than those who remain subject to this penalty.  
See Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1794 (1987) (“The absence of perfection may mean an occasional 
lapse from the norm or it may mean routine, gross disregard for it.”); see also supra 
notes 149-56 and accompanying text (discussing sources of sentencing inequality). 
 115 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 602 (2d ed. 1989) (definition 3). 
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that is, the punishment is not based on the nature of the 
particular things—act and culpability for the act116—on which 
punishment ought to be based.117 
The arbitrary imposition of death sentences once caused 
the Supreme Court to declare capital punishment 
unconstitutional.  In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court 
ruled that Georgia’s death penalty sentencing scheme, which 
allowed juries unbounded discretion in deciding whether to 
sentence an offender convicted of a capital crime to death, 
produced sentencing patterns that were so arbitrary as to 
violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishments.118  Although five justices agreed that the 
sentencing scheme was unconstitutional, the justices could not 
come together to express their reasons in a single opinion; 
instead, each justice wrote only for himself.  The one thread 
that connects the five opinions is their consensus regarding the 
unacceptable arbitrariness of Georgia’s death penalty.119   
  
 116 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 117 As explained supra note 21, this Article does not discuss other factors that 
might legitimately influence punishment, particularly deterrence and incapacitation, 
because they are not relevant to the desirability of categorically excluding juvenile and 
mentally retarded offenders from capital punishment. 
 118 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
 119 The Court’s opinion was issued per curiam with each of the concurring (as 
well as dissenting) justices writing separately to explain his position, which has caused 
some difficulty identifying the central reasoning of Furman.  Most commentators agree, 
however, that arbitrariness was the key defect in the statutes that Furman held 
unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE 
L.J. 908, 914 (1982) (“Although nine separate opinions accompanied the [Furman] 
Court’s per curiam decision, it is fair to say that the case stands for the proposition 
that capital punishment, as then administered, was inflicted arbitrarily or ‘freakishly,’ 
as one of the Justices put it, and was therefore cruel and unusual.” (footnote omitted)); 
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and 
Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 592 (2005) (“All five of the Justices supporting the 
decision expressed concerns about arbitrariness, pointing to the absence of safeguards 
or procedures that would ensure the fair selection of the condemned.”); see also Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The provision for appellate 
review in the Georgia capital-sentencing system serves as a check against the random 
or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.”).  
  Because in 1972 almost all death penalty statutes allowed this kind of 
discretion, the Furman decision effectively shut down capital punishment nationwide.  
Jordan M. Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital Cases, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 2590, 2592 n.12 (1996) (“Of the 40 state statutes in effect at the time of 
Furman, all but Rhode Island’s suffered from the defect of ‘standardless’ discretion and 
were thus unenforceable in light of the decision.”).  Many commentators expected the 
ruling to mark the beginning of the end of capital punishment in this country.  The 
Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 149, 149 (1987) (“The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Furman led many observers to believe that the death 
penalty in America was effectively nullified.” (citing Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon 
Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the Eighth Amendment: Furman and Gregg in 
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Perhaps the clearest expression of the justices’ belief 
that equally culpable offenders must receive equally severe 
sentences is Justice Stewart’s statement that “of all the people 
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as 
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a 
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence 
of death has in fact been imposed.”120  The justices did not 
question whether those who had been sentenced to death 
deserved this punishment; instead, they questioned why these 
offenders had been sentenced to death while others who 
equally deserved this punishment had not.  The justices could 
find no good reason.  Justice Marshall observed that “the 
burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant, 
and the under privileged members of society,” while “the 
wealthier, better-represented, just-as-guilty person can escape” 
this punishment.121  Several justices suggested that there 
simply was no reason why some offenders received death 
sentences while other, no less culpable offenders did not; death 
sentences were a matter of pure chance or bad luck.  Justice 
Stewart, for example, wrote that the death penalty was cruel 
and unusual “in the same way that being struck by lightning is 
cruel and unusual.”122  Similarly, Justice Brennan declared: 
“When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number 
of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is 
virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily.  
Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system.”123   
Justice Brennan considered the possibility that rather 
than suggesting arbitrariness, the small number of death 
sentences suggested that juries were imposing this penalty 
only in the most deserving cases.  The problem with this 
possibility, according to Justice Brennan, was that “[n]o one 
has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in 
those terms the few who die from the many who go to prison.”124  
  
Retrospect, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 927, 944 (1985))).  Just four years later, though, the 
Court  upheld statutes that allowed juries to impose death sentences under certain 
enumerated “aggravating” circumstances, such as when a murder was committed for 
the purpose of obtaining money or avoiding arrest.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158-207 
(plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 120 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
 121 Id. at 365-66 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 122 Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 123 Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 124 Id. at 294. 
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Justice White similarly observed that the death penalty as 
imposed in Georgia lacked a “meaningful basis for 
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the 
many cases in which it is not.”125  Without such a rational, 
meaningful basis, the death penalty was, as Justice Douglas 
wrote, “not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the 
laws that is implicit in the ban on ‘cruel and unusual’ 
punishments.”126  
The moral of Furman is that noncomparative justice is 
not enough.127  Even if those who are sentenced to death 
deserve this punishment, their sentences are arbitrary unless 
some meaningful difference exists between them and other 
defendants who do not receive this punishment.128  If age and 
mental ability were perfect correlates of culpability, then such 
a meaningful difference would exist between, for example, the 
offender who is one week away from his eighteenth birthday 
  
 125 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
 126 Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 127 Noncomparative justice is concerned with whether and to what extent a 
person deserves to be punished, independent of whether and to what extent other 
people are punished.  Thus we can agree with Justice Stewart that even a single day in 
prison for the “crime” of having a cold would be unjust, regardless of how many other 
people received this same punishment for the same “offense.”  Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (“Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual 
punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”).  If, however, some amount of 
time in prison could be a just sentence for having a cold, then it would matter whether 
other people with colds were punished, and what punishments they were given.  A 
day’s imprisonment might be an appropriate sentence when considered in isolation, but 
if other offenders were receiving several months in prison—or  receiving no prison time 
at all—then the sentences would be unjust in a comparative sense.   
  The terms “comparative” and “noncomparative” justice are commonly 
attributed to Joel Feinberg.  E.g., JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 98-99 (1973); 
Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297 (1974).  Other writers have 
used different terms to refer to the same concepts.  E.g., R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, 
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 133 (2001) (using the terms “absolute 
proportionality” and “relative proportionality”); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE 
CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 38-46 
(1985) (applying terms of “cardinal” proportionality and “ordinal” proportionality to 
sentencing); Thomas Hurka, Desert: Individualistic and Holistic, in DESERT AND 
JUSTICE 45, 45-48 (Serena Olsaretti ed., 2003) (using the terms “individualistic” and 
“holistic”), cited in Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive 
Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 710 n.156 (2005). 
 128 Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong to Commute Death Row? Retribution, 
Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319, 1330 (2004) (“Retributive justice requires 
an offender to be punished because and to the extent, but only to the extent, he 
deserves to be punished.  Moreover, as a perfect obligation, retributive justice is subject 
to the demands of equality. Like cases must be treated alike.”); Andrew von Hirsch, 
Hybrid Principles in Allocating Sanctions: A Response to Professor Robinson, 82 NW. U. 
L. REV. 64, 65 (1987) (“In sentencing, the most important desert requirement is that of 
ordinal proportionality.  Acts of comparable seriousness should receive punishments of 
approximately equal severity.”).   
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and the offender who is one week past his, or between the 
offender with an IQ score of 78 and the offender whose score is 
74.  But because such perfect correlations do not exist, neither 
age nor mental ability alone meaningfully distinguishes 
offenders who deserve the death penalty from those who do 
not.129  As a result, it is arbitrary to allow a jury to sentence 
someone to death because he is a few days older or because he 
scores a few points higher on an IQ test than someone who, 
with similar culpability, committed a similar crime yet because 
of his age or mental ability is categorically excluded from 
capital punishment.130   
3. Excessive Punishments: More Severe Than the 
Legislature Intended 
The text of the Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and 
unusual punishments.”131  The Supreme Court has interpreted 
this provision to also prohibit punishments that are 
excessive.132  Although the Court’s decisions leave unclear 
exactly how to measure excessiveness—excessive as compared 
to what?133—one way a sentence may violate the Eighth 
Amendment is by being more severe than the statutorily 
  
 129 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 130 Philosopher Stephen Nathanson similarly argues that it would be 
arbitrary to fail one student for plagiarizing but not to fail, because of sympathy, 
another student who also plagiarized: 
If I have a stated policy of failing students who plagiarize, then it is unjust 
for me to pass students with whom I sympathize.  Whether I am sympathetic 
or not is irrelevant, and I am treating the student whom I do fail unjustly 
because I am not acting simply on the basis of desert.  Rather, I am acting on 
the basis of desert plus degree of sympathy. 
Stephen Nathanson, Does It Matter if the Death Penalty Is Arbitrarily Administered?, 
14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 149, 157 (1985). 
 131 U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 132 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005) (explaining that in 
Atkins “the Court ruled that the death penalty constitutes an excessive sanction for the 
entire category of mentally retarded offenders”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 
n.7 (2002) (“[W]e have read the text of the [Eighth] Amendment to prohibit all 
excessive punishments, as well as cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not 
be excessive.”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment 
bars not only those punishments that are ‘barbaric’ but also those that are ‘excessive’ in 
relation to the crime committed.”). 
 133 This question is borrowed from Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison 
Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to 
What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571 (2005). 
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sanctioned punishments.134  Thus, the Supreme Court could 
not, for example, require a non-death penalty state to impose 
this punishment.135  
When the Court ruled that mentally retarded and 
juvenile offenders could no longer be sentenced to death, the 
death penalty became an even more severe, and perhaps 
excessive, punishment for those still subject to it.  One reason 
excluding some offenders whom a legislature meant to be 
included results in more severe punishments for those who are 
still included is that the punitive value of a punishment is in 
part a function of how many people receive the punishment.  
When capital punishment was imposed for many offenses—not 
just murder but also witchcraft, adultery, pig theft, and 
burning down tobacco warehouses136—death was not, in a 
relative sense, an especially severe sentence.  Those sentenced 
to death were condemned as ordinary, run-of-the-mill felons.  
Now, when capital punishment is reserved for the “worst of the 
worst” murders,137 death is an especially severe sentence.  
Those sentenced to death are condemned as less than human.138   
  
 134 See Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After 
Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 & n.149 (1995) (noting that “judges may not 
impose greater punishment than the legislature has authorized” and that the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of excessive punishment “plainly includ[es] punishment 
beyond that legislatively authorized”); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 
299, 304 (1932) (holding that legislative intent determines whether cumulative 
punishments may be imposed for the same conduct: “[W]here the same act or 
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be 
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each 
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”). 
 135 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? 
Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 
865 (1992) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?] (noting that 
“requiring a state that does not embrace the death penalty to execute certain 
murderers . . . would clearly fail Eighth Amendment scrutiny because the Eighth 
Amendment must also protect defendants against punishment not authorized by their 
local communities”); cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[B]ecause of 
the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually 
represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts 
should define criminal activity.”). 
 136 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
42-44 (1993) (discussing crimes punishable by death in colonial America).  
 137 See supra note 4. 
 138 See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Death Penalty in America: Yesterday and 
Today, 95 DICK. L. REV. 759, 768 (1991) (“Defenders of the death penalty insist that the 
killings they favor are justified, desirable, legal, authorized—and therefore are 
‘necessary.’  Besides, we are told, those who are condemned to die by the death penalty 
are less than human.”); Robert A. Burt, Judges, Behavioral Scientists, and the 
Demands of Humanity, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 191-92 (1994) (noting “our current 
romantic obsession with the death penalty: the premise that criminal offenders are not 
simply different from law-abiding citizens, but that they are so different as to stand 
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It is not only the expression but also the experience of 
condemnation that becomes more severe as fewer offenders 
receive death sentences.  Psychologists attribute this kind of 
relative valuing of punishments to the process of social 
comparison.139  Philosophers speak in terms of the comparative 
nature of desert.140  Regardless of how it is explained, the 
  
altogether outside the bounds of humanity”); cf. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 361 (“The overall goal of the defense is to present a human 
narrative . . . so the jury will be less inclined to cast [the defendant] out of the human 
circle.”). 
  Relatedly, because imposing the death penalty is the most severe 
condemnation, a decision not to impose the death penalty may be interpreted as a 
statement that the offender’s victims are not as valued as the victims of offenders who 
have been sentenced to death.  See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 162 (1986) (“The victim’s mother cries out for 
the murderer to be executed and is dissatisfied with any lesser penalty, precisely 
because the death penalty is available as the most substantial response to willful 
killing in the United States at this time.  Because it is available, any lesser penalty 
would depreciate the significance of the crime and would confer second-class status on 
the life, and the circumstances of the death, of the victim.”); Randall L. Kennedy, 
McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1388, 1391 (1988) (concluding that race-of-the-victim disparities in imposing the 
death penalty “indicate a devaluation of black victims: put bluntly, officials in Georgia 
place a higher value on the lives of whites than blacks” (internal punctuation omitted)); 
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man’s Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 
81 OR. L. REV. 15, 32 (2002) (“Disproportionate application of the death penalty in cases 
where the victim is white compared to cases where the victim is black reflect a 
disturbing racial calculus: White lives are considered to be more valuable than black 
lives, because the killing of a white is treated as a more serious crime—a crime worthy 
of a more severe punishment—than the killing of a black.”). 
 139 See generally Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 
HUM. REL. 117 (1954) (proposing that one way that people assess their own abilities is 
through comparisons to others); see also William Austin, Equity Theory and Social 
Comparison Processes, in SOCIAL COMPARISON PROCESSES: THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 279, 279 (Jerry M. Suls & Richard L. Miller eds., 1977) 
(“Philosophers and social scientists both seem to agree that social comparison processes 
are indelibly linked with perceptions of ‘fairness,’ ‘justice,’ or ‘equity.’  Scholars agree 
first that questions of fairness or justice inevitably arise from subjective, evaluative 
judgments, and second that such judgments can occur only after an individual locates 
himself within some frame of reference.” (citations omitted)).  A related concept is 
relative deprivation, which explains “the important observation that feelings of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one’s outcomes depend more on subjective 
standards, such as the level of outcomes obtained by salient comparison persons, than 
on objective prosperity.”  James M. Olson & J. Douglas Hazlewood, Relative 
Deprivation and Social Comparison: An Integrative Perspective, in RELATIVE 
DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM, VOLUME 4, at 1, 2 
(James M. Olson et al. eds., 1986); see also PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN 
SOCIAL LIFE 158-60 (1964) (discussing the principles of relative gratification and 
relative deprivation). 
 140 E.g., Shelly Kagan, Comparative Desert, in DESERT AND JUSTICE 93, 98 
(Serena Olsaretti ed., 2003) (“[C]omparative desert demands that my level of well-
being bear a certain relation to your level of well-being, where this precise relation is 
itself a function of how our levels of virtue compare.”); Owen McLeod, On the 
Comparative Element of Justice, in DESERT AND JUSTICE, supra, at 123, 144 (“[A]ny 
total theory of justice will have to explain the fact that the justice of what you receive 
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conclusion that the “desert-satisfying power” of a particular 
punishment is relative or comparative is confirmed by a host of 
everyday, real-world experiences.141  It is readily understood by, 
for example, any student who after receiving a grade of “F” on a 
test has wondered whether anyone else also received the same 
grade.  A student who alone receives a failing grade 
understands her performance on the test to have been 
especially bad, whereas a student who fails along with the rest 
of her class does not.   
The comparative or relative value of grades, and by 
extension of rewards and punishments more generally, is even 
more apparent when the grades are assigned on a curve.  If a 
curve allows only three “A” grades but the best six exams are 
essentially the same, the reward value of the “A” grades is 
excessive—that is, the three students who receive the “A” 
grades are being told that their work is better than the work of 
all but two of their classmates when it really is only better than 
all but five.142  Similarly, if a curve allows only three students to 
receive “F” grades but the worst six exams are essentially the 
same, then the punishment value of the “F” grades is 
excessive—that is, assigning the “F” grades tells three students 
that their work is worse than all but two of their classmates 
when it really is only worse than all but five. 
The categorical exclusions adopted in Atkins and Roper 
act like a forced curve, allowing the death penalty to be 
imposed in fewer cases than some legislatures had deemed 
warranted.  Prior to Atkins, twenty states had not excluded 
mentally retarded offenders from capital punishment, the same 
number that prior to Roper had allowed juveniles to be 
  
can have something to do with how it compares to what others receive.”); Peter 
Simpson, Book Review, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVIEWS (Jul. 1, 2004), http://ndpr.nd.edu/ 
review.cfm?id=1451 (reviewing SERENA OLSARETTI, ED. DESERT AND JUSTICE (Oxford, 
2003)) (arguing that “justice in distribution is secured if my share is related to my 
desert as your share is related to your desert. Then I get absolutely what I deserve 
because I get what I comparatively deserve.”). 
 141 McLeod, supra note 140, at 144.  The examples presented here involving 
grades are inspired by similar examples presented in, among others, McLeod, supra 
note 140, and Nathanson, supra note 130.  
 142 This is the reverse of the problem of grade inflation, the problem that 
awarding too many “A’s” diminishes the grade’s value.  See Simpson, supra note 140.  
(“[S]uppose an excellent student absolutely deserves an A but the professor gives 
mediocre students As as well. Then, in this case, the A grade fails to be appropriate to 
the excellent student’s desert since it fails to indicate his superiority over the mediocre 
students.”).  Awarding not enough “A’s” has the opposite effect, increasing the grade’s 
value. 
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sentenced to death.143  In these states, after Atkins and Roper, 
the punitive value of the death penalty is enhanced for the non-
juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders who remain 
subject to this punishment.144   
Moreover, had these legislatures known when they 
enacted their death penalty statutes that the Supreme Court 
would eventually rule that mentally retarded and juvenile 
offenders could not be sentenced to death—that is, had the 
legislatures known that only some of the offenders that they 
considered worthy of capital punishment could receive this 
punishment—the legislatures might have decided not to 
sentence any offenders to death, or to sentence a different 
subset of offenders.145  Because the death penalty is 
qualitatively different from all other kinds of punishments,146 
  
 143 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005).  As the Court explained: 
When Atkins was decided, 30 States prohibited the death penalty for the 
mentally retarded. This number comprised 12 that had abandoned the death 
penalty altogether, and 18 that maintained it but excluded the mentally 
retarded from its reach. By a similar calculation in this case, 30 States 
prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have rejected the 
death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express provision or 
judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach. 
Id. at 564 (citation omitted). 
 144 See Andrew von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing 
Theory, 42 MD. L. REV. 6, 28 (1983) (“If A and B commit a given kind of crime under 
circumstances suggesting similar culpability, they deserve similar punishments. 
Imposing unequal punishments on them . . . unjustly treats one as though he were 
more to blame for his conduct than the other.”); see also William S. Laufer & Nien-hê 
Hsieh, Choosing Equal Injustice, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 343, 347-49 (2003) (arguing that 
failing to punish some offenders has the effect of imposing on those who are punished 
“a burden of relative disadvantage,” which causes them “to be punished more than they 
deserve”). 
 145 Although it might seem unlikely at best that a legislature would be 
motivated by concern for fairness to criminal defendants, such skepticism might reflect 
an unduly pessimistic view of legislatures.  As Professor Ronald Wright has argued in a 
somewhat different context, 
Such pessimism about legislatures in criminal justice . . . is overstated.  The 
facts on the ground tell us that legislatures sometimes vote for things that 
benefit the defense even when courts interpreting the Constitution do not 
demand them.  For instance, states have long provided defense counsel in a 
broader range of cases than the Constitution strictly requires.  Given the 
minimal levels of competence required to satisfy the Sixth Amendment and 
due process guarantee of effective counsel, most states already fund their 
systems at levels higher than the bare minimum that the Constitution would 
tolerate. 
Wright, supra note 2, at 254-55 (footnote omitted). 
 146 As the Supreme Court has stated: 
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not 
in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its 
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the offenders who are sentenced to death must be qualitatively 
different from all other people who commit crimes, even the 
crime of murder.147  When deciding the statutory criteria that 
define this category of “worst of the worst” offenses, 
legislatures make assessments about which kinds of murders 
are both similar to each other and different from other kinds of 
murders.  For example, a legislature might decide that the 
murder of a child and the murder of a police officer are 
sufficiently similar to each other—perhaps because both cause 
a special kind of harm to society—and are also sufficiently 
more harmful than other more ordinary murders to justify 
capital punishment.  The legislature is not deciding in an 
abstract, Platonic Forms sense which murders are worthy of 
capital punishment but is instead making relative assessments 
about which murders are worse than all other murders; 
therefore, excluding from capital punishment a certain subset 
of offenders who murder children or police officers, as the Court 
did in Atkins and Roper, challenges the legislature’s entire 
assessment of which offenses merit the death penalty.  Had 
this legislature known that the Supreme Court would one day 
prohibit sentencing to death any offender who, for example, 
before his eighteenth birthday murdered a child or a police 
officer, the legislature might have decided not to impose the 
death penalty on any offenders who commit these offenses.  
Executing non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders 
whose death sentences were imposed under statutes that had, 
before Atkins and Roper, allowed juvenile or mentally retarded 
offenders also to be sentenced to death presumes that the 
legislatures that enacted those statutes would have believed 
  
rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. 
And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in 
our concept of humanity. 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that “the penalty of death is qualitatively 
different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long”); cf. Nathanson, supra note 
130, at 162 (“I conclude then that the argument from arbitrariness has special force 
against the death penalty because of its extreme severity and its likely uselessness.  
The arbitrariness of other punishments may be outweighed by their necessity, but the 
same cannot be said for capital punishment.”). 
 147 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432 (1980) (reversing a death sentence 
because “[t]he petitioner’s crimes cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness 
materially more ‘depraved’ than that of any person guilty of murder”); Furman, 408 
U.S. at 248 n.11 (Douglas, J., concurring) (requiring capital sentencing schemes to 
provide a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death 
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not”). 
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these non-juvenile and non-mentally retarded offenders to still 
deserve the death penalty had it known that others it believed 
to deserve the death penalty would be excluded from this 
punishment.  But this presumption might be wrong.  Just as a 
teacher might prefer to not fail anyone if she could not fail 
everyone whom she believed to deserve to fail, a legislature 
might have decided to not sentence any offenders to death if it 
could not sentence to death all the offenders whom it believed 
to deserve this punishment.  And while students might not 
have a legal right to the grade that their teacher thinks that 
they deserve, criminal defendants do have a constitutional 
right to a punishment that is not excessive—that is, to a 
punishment that is not more severe than the punishment that 
their legislature thinks that they deserve.148   
II. THE BIGGER PICTURE: SEEKING FAIRNESS AND 
CONSISTENCY 
A. Inequalities Abound (But That’s No Excuse for Adding 
More) 
Categorical exclusions are, of course, not the only reason 
that equally culpable offenders will sometimes receive 
unequally severe punishments.149  Prosecutors’ decisions not to 
seek the death penalty for reasons unrelated to culpability—
reasons such as the defendant’s agreement to plead guilty in 
exchange for a lesser charge, or the wishes of the victim’s 
family—likely account for most cases, certainly for more cases 
than will the categorical exclusions adopted in Atkins or 
Roper.150  But the fact that a variety of factors cause some 
equally culpable offenders to receive unequally severe 
punishments does not mean that the disparities that Atkins 
  
 148 See Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?, supra note 135, at 865 
(noting that “the Eighth Amendment must also protect defendants against punishment 
not authorized by their local communities” and that “a disassociation of individual 
sentencing decisions from a state’s internal consensus regarding just punishment 
would . . . violate the Eighth Amendment”).   
 149 See id. at 867 (noting that “vast arbitrariness exists in the operation of the 
criminal justice system prior to sentencing—in the investigation of crime, the charging 
decision, the plea offer (if any), the decision to seek the death penalty, and the 
effectiveness of defendant’s counsel”). 
 150 Scott W. Howe, The Constitution and Capital Sentencing: Pursuing Justice 
and Equality, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 749, 788 (1992) (stating that “if anything is clear 
about the administration of the death penalty, it is that most death-eligible offenders 
escape the death penalty through discretionary decisions made outside the sentencing 
proceeding”). 
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and Roper cause are not problematic.  Indeed, a growing 
number of commentators are arguing for increased honesty and 
transparency in plea bargaining and other exercises of 
prosecutorial discretion, so as to diminish disparities in 
sentences among equally culpable offenders.151  While Atkins 
and Roper might not create a huge number of additional 
disparities, the desired trend is toward fewer rather than more 
unequal sentences among equally culpable offenders.   
Additionally, the potential for disparities increases as 
courts consider calls to extend the “Atkins logic” to traits other 
than mental ability and age.  Many commentators have noted 
that such characteristics as mental illness, alcohol and other 
drug addictions, a history of childhood abuse, and an 
impoverished background are especially prevalent among 
death row inmates.152  All of these characteristics, like age and 
mental ability, likely correlate with culpability.  For example, 
as the severity of a psychotic disorder or a substance abuse 
  
 151 As the Report of the Massachusetts Governor’s Council on Capital 
Punishment stated: 
[I]n the special context of the death penalty, it is essential to ensure that 
local prosecutorial discretion is exercised in a reasonably rational and 
consistent manner, so that—as much as humanly possible—like cases are 
treated alike, and different cases are treated differently.  This basic principle 
was central to the U.S. Supreme Court’s modern constitutional mandate for 
capital punishment, as expressed in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), 
and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and it remains a constitutional 
requirement for all capital sentencing systems today. 
Report of the Massachusetts Governor’s Council on Capital Punishment, 80 IND. L.J. 1, 
12 (2005); see also Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 109 (2002) (proposing that “hard” prosecutorial screening systems 
can, among other benefits, diminish unequal treatment). 
 152 E.g., Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: 
Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 766 (2005) (noting 
that capital defendants “very frequently are extremely intellectually limited, are 
suffering from some form of mental illness, are in the powerful grip of a drug or alcohol 
addiction, are survivors of childhood abuse, or are the victims of some sort of societal 
deprivation (be it poverty, racism, poor education, inadequate health care, or some 
noxious combination of the above)” (citing DOROTHY OTNOW LEWIS, GUILTY BY REASON 
OF INSANITY: A PSYCHIATRIST EXPLORES THE MINDS OF KILLERS (1998) (documenting 
the prevalence of organic mental defects and histories of childhood abuse among death 
row inmates); Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for 
the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143, 1172-73 (1999) (documenting the prevalence 
of histories of childhood abuse among murderers in general and capital defendants in 
particular); Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and 
the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 566, 585 (1995) (documenting the 
prevalence of impoverished backgrounds and histories of drug or alcohol abuse among 
death row inmates))). 
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disorder increases, culpability tends to decrease.153  Someone 
who was abused or neglected as a child is likely to be less 
culpable for her actions than someone who enjoyed a well-
cared-for childhood, in the same way that a juvenile or 
mentally retarded offender is likely to be less culpable than a 
non-juvenile or non-mentally retarded offender.154  As a result 
of this similarity, treating these additional categories of 
offenders differently from juvenile and mentally retarded 
offenders with respect to eligibility for the death penalty might 
be unjust, or—as one scholar has argued—might even be a 
violation of equal protection.155  Several state court justices 
have already expressed agreement with the argument that 
Atkins should apply to mentally ill offenders.156  If these 
additional characteristics, or any other imperfect correlates of 
culpability, become grounds for additional categorical 
exclusions, then an increasing number of offenders will become 
ineligible for the death penalty not because they are in fact less 
culpable but because they possess traits that make them likely 
to be less culpable.  Death sentences will then increasingly 
become not so much pronouncements of actual culpability as 
actuarial assessments of likely culpability. 
It is possible to think that avoiding the risk that juries 
will sentence to death some juvenile or mentally retarded 
offenders who do not deserve this punishment justifies 
whatever inequalities categorical exclusions might cause.  The 
Court itself suggested such a possibility in both Atkins and 
  
 153 See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, 
and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1210 (2005) (suggesting that 
“[a]n offender’s mental illness or addiction to drugs reduces his or her capacity to obey 
the law, thus making the offender less blameworthy”). 
 154 Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for 
the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143, 1179 (1999) (“Psychological and medical 
literature reveals how physical abuse as a child may have long-term negative 
repercussions for the defendant’s ability to make appropriate judgments, to understand 
the consequences of his actions, and to control his behavior.”); Paul Litton, The “Abuse 
Excuse” in Capital Sentencing Trials: Is It Relevant to Responsibility, Punishment, or 
Neither?, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1027, 1071 (2005) (“In recognizing that the death 
penalty is not intended for all murder convicts, it is worth stressing that defendants 
who suffered severe abuse and neglect were deprived of a safeguard in comparison to 
others who were not treated as such.”). 
 155 Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental 
Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293, 294 (2003) (“The ultimate conclusion is that 
distinguishing between people with significant mental illness, people with mental 
retardation, and juveniles in the application of capital punishment violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.”). 
 156 See, e.g., Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502-03 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J., 
dissenting); State v. Nelson, 803 A.2d 1, 48-49 (N.J. 2002) (Zazzali, J., concurring). 
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Roper.157  But accepting categorical exclusions as risk-avoiding 
measures does not make the consequences any less unjust for 
those offenders who remain subject to the death penalty.158  
Moreover, no evidence exists that mentally retarded or juvenile 
offenders are especially likely to be wrongfully sentenced to 
death.  Indeed, the Court’s reliance on the “infrequent” and 
“uncommon” executions of juvenile and mentally retarded 
offenders to support its findings of a national consensus 
against such sentences159 is inconsistent with its suggestion 
that categorical exclusions are needed to address special risks 
of wrongful death sentences.160 
  
 157 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2005) (referring to the “risk [of] 
allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient 
culpability”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“Mentally retarded 
defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution.”). 
 158 The argument that fairness to those who remain subject to the death 
penalty matters in evaluating the desirability of categorical exclusions is not meant to 
suggest that the harms of erroneous exclusion are equal to the harms of erroneous 
inclusion.  But so long as the Supreme Court is willing to allow anyone to be sentenced 
to death, death sentences should be as fair as possible.  Fairness is diminished when 
equally culpable offenders receive unequally severe sentences.  
 159 Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (noting that “even in the 20 States without a formal 
prohibition, the execution of juveniles is infrequent”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 
(observing that “even in those States that allow the execution of mentally retarded 
offenders, the practice is uncommon”). 
 160 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 620-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “the 
Court itself acknowledges that the execution of under-18 offenders is ‘infrequent’ even 
in the States ‘without a formal prohibition on executing juveniles,’ suggesting that 
juries take seriously their responsibility to weigh youth as a mitigating factor” (citation 
omitted)); cf. Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using 
State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 
1144 (2006) (“If the Court is correct that jurors are incapable of assessing whether the 
death penalty may be applicable to juveniles and other categories of defendant, then 
looking to how often juries apply the death penalty is entirely illogical.”). 
  The Court’s discussions of special risks also included the possibility that 
some jurors might inappropriately consider evidence of an offender’s mental 
retardation or youth as supporting an aggravating, rather than mitigating, factor.  
Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (“In some cases a defendant’s youth may even be counted 
against him.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (stating that “reliance on mental retardation as 
a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the 
aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury”).  The same is 
also true, though, of many kinds of evidence that defendants commonly present to 
sentencing juries.  See John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the 
Forensic Psychologist, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 73, 90 (2003) (“[M]ental illness, 
substance abuse, and having a deprived and abusive childhood, factors that would 
appear to be mitigating and arising sympathy, may be viewed as aggravating and 
suggestive of future dangerousness.”); Welsh S. White, A Deadly Dilemma: Choices by 
Attorneys Representing “Innocent” Capital Defendants, 102 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2035 
(2004) (explaining that evidence of a defendant’s problems, such as mental illness or 
childhood abuse, is “double-edged” because “while it does explain where the defendant 
has come from and how he got to be the way he is, it also has the potential to not only 
eliminate any lingering doubts jurors might have had as to the defendant’s guilt, but 
also to strengthen their perception that sparing his life will enhance the danger to 
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Another potential pragmatic argument in favor of 
categorical exclusions is that they are a lesser of evils, or an 
imperfect means justified by the desired ends of fewer 
offenders who may be sentenced to death.  The problem with 
this argument, though, is that it is not possible to predict all of 
the ends that Atkins and Roper will produce.  Certainly, one 
result is that some offenders who were sentenced to death will 
not be executed.161  But the decisions likely will have other 
effects as well.  For example, because Atkins and Roper 
proclaim to be making the death penalty more just, these 
  
society, a consideration that empirical data indicate will weigh heavily in the penalty 
jury’s decision”).  The fact that evidence is “double-edged,” however, does not mean that 
it useless to a defendant: “even double-edged mitigating evidence can be used to 
present a powerful case for life by causing the jury to empathize with the defendant.”  
White, supra, at 2036. 
  The Court further noted the possibility that mentally retarded offenders 
are likely to confess falsely.  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (noting “the possibility of false 
confessions”).  But this is a guilt-phase rather than sentencing-phase problem.  Cf. id. 
at 352 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have never before held it to be cruel and unusual 
punishment to impose a sentence in violation of some other constitutional 
imperative.”).  Moreover, recent research suggests that other characteristics—including 
factual innocence—also lead to false confessions.  Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of 
Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents At Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 215 (2005).  Of 
the 123 cases since 1973 that the Death Penalty Information Center identifies as 
exonerations, four were juveniles and three were either diagnosed as mentally retarded 
or had an IQ score suggestive of mental retardation.  See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., 
Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
article.php?scid=6&did=110 (last visited Jul. 5, 2006).  And while it is impossible to 
know the extent to which the age or mental ability of these seven defendants 
contributed to their wrongful convictions, most of their trials were marred by the kinds 
of misconduct that seem to be present in a great many wrongful conviction cases: 
witnesses who committed perjury or prosecutors who suppressed or inappropriately 
used evidence.  Id.; see also Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous 
Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 481 (1996) 
(discussing witness perjury and prosecutorial misconduct as sources of wrongful 
convictions in capital cases). 
 161 These offenders include seventy one juveniles who were on death row as of 
December 2004.  Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Juvenile Offenders Who Were on Death Row, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=204&scid=27#streibcaselist (last visited 
Jul. 5, 2006).  The number of offenders whose death sentences will be reversed because 
of Atkins is still being sorted out, as courts hear claims of mental retardation.  See 
Nava Feldman, Annotation, Application of Constitutional Rule of Atkins v. Virginia 
that Execution of Mentally Retarded Persons Constitutes “Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment” in Violation of Eighth Amendment, 122 A.L.R.5th 145 (2004) (collecting 
cases). 
  While considering the effects of the Court’s decisions on these individual 
offenders is important, it is also important to consider the decisions’ wider effects.  Cf. 
Ogletree, supra note 138, at 34-35 (“As an abolitionist, I feel that we must constantly 
be asking what the likely outcome will be from any arguments we raise against the 
death penalty.”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support 
Legislative “Reform” of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 431 (2002) 
[hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative “Reform”] 
(proposing that abolitionists “must have a long-term strategy that allocates some 
resources toward current cases and some toward larger goals”).  
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decisions risk diminishing opposition to the death penalty 
among those who fear that it cannot be administered justly.162  
Additionally, lawmakers who might have been willing to 
support reforms that really could make the death penalty more 
just—reforms such as increasing funding for defense counsel163 
or eliminating death qualification of jurors at the guilt 
stage164—might now be less inclined to support such proposals 
given the possibility that the Supreme Court will take adoption 
of such legislation as evidence of a national consensus and 
declare that the Constitution makes the legislature’s decision 
irreversible.165  Some evidence suggests that the Atkins decision 
might have diminished legislative interest in reforming the 
death penalty: in 2001, the year preceding the Atkins decision, 
“lawmakers in nearly every state that retained the death 
penalty sponsored a series of capital punishment-related bills 
that have paved the way for unprecedented reform,”166 but since 
2001, such legislative activity has been scarce.167  Of course, 
  
 162 See supra note 1. 
 163 See sources cited supra note 2. 
 164 See Erik Lillquist, Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty, 42 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 45, 88 (2005) (noting a “robust scholarly consensus that death-qualification of 
jurors lowers the effective standard of proof in capital cases”). 
 165 See Jacobi, supra note 160, at 1152 (arguing that “anti-death penalty 
actions of Supreme Court Justices could result in higher rates of death penalty 
legislation and executions, as states protect their policymaking powers.  Thus the 
feedback effects between courts and legislatures makes judicial reliance on state 
legislation subjective and its effects unpredictable.”).   
 166 Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The Death Penalty in 2001: Year End Report 4, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/YearEndReport2001.pdf (Dec. 2001) (noting that 
these measures included bans on executing mentally retarded offenders enacted in five 
states, calls for a moratorium on executions in eighteen states, legislation providing 
inmates with greater access to post-conviction DNA testing enacted in seventeen 
states, and changes to provide better legal representation for indigent defendants 
adopted in “many death penalty states”); see also Steiker & Steiker, Should 
Abolitionists Support Legislative “Reform”, supra note 161, at 417-18 (discussing 
legislative activity). 
 167 In each of the years from 2002 to 2005, only a handful of state legislatures 
adopted death penalty reforms.  Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The Death Penalty in 2005: 
Year End Report 2, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/yearend05.pdf (Dec. 2005) (listing 
as state developments that Illinois and New Jersey continued to ban executions, that 
Kansas and New York failed to pass new death penalty legislation after those states’ 
highest courts overturned prior death penalty laws, that the New Mexico legislature 
came close to voting to abolish the death penalty, that the Massachusetts legislature 
voted against the governor’s proposed death penalty, and that California and North 
Carolina appointed commissions to study the death penalty system); Death Penalty 
Info. Ctr., The Death Penalty in 2004: Year End Report 1-2, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DPICyer04.pdf (Dec. 2004) (reporting that New York’s 
legislature did not enact new death penalty legislation to replace the death penalty 
statute that the state’s highest court ruled unconstitutional, that California’s 
legislature commissioned a study of that state’s death penalty, that Illinois continued 
its moratorium, and that New Jersey halted executions over concerns about execution 
 
2007] HOW MANY WRONGS MAKE A RIGHT 1253 
such a change in legislative activity is undoubtedly the result 
of many factors, but the possibility that the Atkins decision is 
one of those factors suggests that the evils of categorical 
exclusions might, in the long run, not be lesser after all.168 
B. Categorical Exclusions and the Furman-Lockett 
“Tension” 
In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court’s first real 
foray into regulating the death penalty,169 the Court decreed 
that this punishment must be administered either consistently 
or not at all.170  Several years after Furman, the Court ruled in 
  
methods); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The Death Penalty in 2003: Year End Report 3, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/YER-03-F.pdf (Dec. 2003) (noting comprehensive 
criminal justice reform adopted by the Illinois legislature and a vote by the North 
Carolina senate in favor of a moratorium on executions); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The 
Death Penalty in 2002: Year End Report 4, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
yrendrpt02.pdf (Dec. 2002) (describing, in addition to reforms enacted to comply with 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Atkins v. Virginia and Ring v. Arizona, the 
moratorium instituted in Maryland and the one continued in Illinois, Indiana’s law 
prohibiting executions of offenders under 18, Pennsylvania’s law allowing post-
conviction DNA testing, and heightened requirements for trial attorneys in California 
and Washington). 
 168 It might be easier to embrace categorical exclusions as a lesser evil but for 
the availability of arguments against the death penalty that are not contingent upon 
what evils actually result.  Many writers, for example, have persuasively argued that 
the basic problem with all capital sentencing is the impossibility of achieving 
infallibility.  See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY 
OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 96 (1974) (“Though the justice of God may indeed ordain that 
some should die, the justice of man is altogether and always insufficient for saying who 
these may be.”); see also Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving 
Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 
1064 (1978) (“If infallibility is to be required for any case, it should be required where 
the deprivation is irrevocable; and if infallibility is to be required in any case in which 
the deprivation is irrevocable, it should be required where the irrevocable deprivation 
is of life itself.”). 
 169 See Carol S. Steiker, Remembering Race, Rape, and Capital Punishment, 
83 VA. L. REV. 693, 704 (1997) (book review) (noting that “the Supreme Court first 
‘constitutionalized’ death penalty law in Furman v. Georgia”); Note, Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments in The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 76, 76 (1972) (“In 
Furman v. Georgia the Supreme Court for the first time ruled directly on the 
constitutionality of capital punishment under the cruel and unusual punishments 
clause of the eighth amendment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 170 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that 
the Eighth Amendment requires capital punishment to be applied consistently); see 
also Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1147 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (“There is little doubt now that Furman’s essential holding was 
correct.  Although most of the public seems to desire, and the Constitution appears to 
permit, the penalty of death, it surely is beyond dispute that if the death penalty 
cannot be administered consistently and rationally, it may not be administered at 
all.”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (referring to “the Court’s 
insistence that capital punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, 
or not at all”). 
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Lockett v. Ohio that to ensure fairness to individual offenders, 
capital sentencing juries must be allowed to consider a nearly 
limitless171 range of reasons for not imposing the death 
penalty.172  Many commentators have accused the Furman and 
Lockett decisions of creating a “tension” between consistency 
and fairness.173  The Supreme Court has, on occasion, expressed 
the same idea.174  The root of the problem is that procedures 
adopted to enhance one goal often have the unintended 
consequence of diminishing the other.  For example, since 
  
 171 Under Lockett, the jury must consider all relevant mitigating evidence.  
What counts as relevant mitigating evidence is “evidence which tends logically to prove 
or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to 
have mitigating value.”  Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284-85 (2004) (quoting 
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990) (internal citation omitted)).  For an 
argument that only culpability-related mitigating evidence is constitutionally required, 
see Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?, supra note 135, at 840. 
 172 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from 
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and 
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.”); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 
(1976) (plurality opinion) (“[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity 
underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and 
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” 
(internal citation omitted)); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
(“A jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why 
a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed.”). 
 173 E.g., Vivian Berger, “Black Box Decisions” on Life or Death—If They’re 
Arbitrary, Don’t Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1067, 1080 (1991) (proposing that “the Court’s dual sentencing objectives 
strongly resemble Siamese twins—locked at the hip but straining uncomfortably in 
opposite directions”); Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: 
Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1155 (1980) (“Thus, if death as a 
punishment requires both maximum flexibility and non-arbitrariness, and these 
requirements cannot both be met (because flexibility and nonarbitrariness must vary 
inversely), then death cannot be a permissible punishment.”); Scott E. Sundby, The 
Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital 
Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1196 (1991) (referring to “the tension between 
Furman’s call for guided discretion and Lockett’s requirement of unrestricted 
presentation of relevant mitigating evidence”); see also Stephen P. Garvey, “As the 
Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1001 
(1996) (“Commentators have often remarked that Furman’s mandate of consistency 
and Woodson’s mandate of individualization compete with one another at some level.”). 
 174 See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994) (“The objectives of 
these two inquiries can be in some tension . . . .”); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 6-7 
(1994) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s concern that the death penalty be both appropriate 
and not randomly imposed requires the States to perform two somewhat contradictory 
tasks in order to impose the death penalty.”); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182 
(1988) (plurality opinion) (“Arguably these two lines of cases . . . are somewhat in 
‘tension’ with each other.” (citation omitted)); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 
(1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]ension . . . has long existed between the two 
central principles [of consistency and individualized sentencing] of our Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
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Furman, one way that legislatures have attempted to narrow 
the category of offenders who are eligible for the death penalty 
is by enacting lists of statutory aggravating factors and 
allowing juries to impose the death penalty only when one or 
more of the factors on the list is present.175  The purpose of 
limiting capital punishment to those cases in which one or 
more aggravating factors is present is to achieve consistency 
among those offenders who are sentenced to death.176  But 
limiting capital punishment to crimes in which certain 
statutory aggravating factors are present achieves consistency 
without compromising individual fairness only if the list of 
aggravating factors is neither under- nor over-inclusive.177  
  
 175 These aggravating factors must “reasonably justify the imposition of a 
more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder” and 
“genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.”  Zant v. 
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983); see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 
(1980) (“[A State must] define the crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way 
that obviates standardless sentencing discretion.” (alterations and internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 176 “[S]tatutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary 
function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons 
eligible for the death penalty.”  Zant, 462 U.S. at 878. 
 177 This is arguably the most serious pragmatic problem with capital 
punishment.  Present statutes are undoubtedly over-inclusive. See sources cited supra 
note 6.  Legislatures might remedy this problem by limiting capital punishment to one 
or two crimes for which there is broad agreement that if any crime justifies the death 
penalty, it would be these.  Two fairly obvious candidates for such crimes are the 
murder of a child and the murder of more than one person.  See Stephen P. Garvey, 
Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1538, 1556 (1998) (“Murders involving child victims are highly aggravating, but 
otherwise jurors claim that the victim’s status and standing make little difference.”); 
David McCord, An Open Letter to Governor George Ryan Concerning How to Fix the 
Death Penalty System, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 451, 455 (2001) (suggesting multiple victims 
as an example of the worst kind of murder); Conference, The Death Penalty in the 
Twenty-First Century, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 345 (1995) (remarks of Diann Rust-
Tierney, Director of the ACLU Capital Punishment Project and Vice Chair of the 
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty) (same).   But this approach raises the 
problem of under-inclusiveness.  The idea that legislatures are capable of constructing 
a list of aggravating circumstances that will succeed both in making all offenders who 
deserve the death penalty eligible for this punishment and in excluding all offenders 
who do not deserve this punishment might be wishful thinking: 
The response of the states to Furman was a valiant effort to introduce 
evenhandedness where irregularity had prevailed. But the outcome has been 
no more successful than that of the prior system of capital punishment. This 
failure has not resulted from lack of effort but rather from the impossibility of 
fashioning an acceptable method of administering capital punishment while 
maintaining the system of rights that our Constitution mandates. 
Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 928 (1982); see 
also Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1599, 1607 (2001) (“[T]he method of distinguishing the worst of the 
worst is no more precise now than it was prior to Furman. The moral determination 
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Otherwise, as Justice Blackmun suggested, “[a] step toward 
consistency is a step away from fairness.”178 
The procedural requirements of Lockett produce the 
same kind of problem.  The goal of allowing defendants to 
present unlimited mitigation evidence is to ensure that a jury 
will not impose a death sentence when a lesser sentence is 
deserved.179  But allowing juries to consider unlimited 
mitigation evidence—including evidence of factors not related 
to culpability—invites its own inequalities.180  For example, 
under Lockett, a jury could decide not to impose the death 
penalty for such non-culpability-related reasons as sympathy 
for the offender’s family or admiration for the offender’s 
behavior in prison.181  Or the jury could make the opposite 
decision, to impose the death penalty, for the opposite reasons: 
lack of sympathy or admiration.182  Either way, the result is 
diminished consistency, or unequal sentences for equal 
culpability. 
Given that requiring legislatures to specify aggravating 
factors or to in some other way narrow the category of offenders 
  
involved in this choice may render impossible a rational and precise description of the 
types of defendants who should be put to death.”). 
 178 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1149 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari).  
 179 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (“By holding that the 
sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, 
the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual 
differences is a false consistency.”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“[A] 
statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent 
mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and record and to 
circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death 
penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.”). 
 180 Stephen R. McAllister, The Problem of Implementing a Constitutional 
System of Capital Punishment, 43 KAN. L. REV. 1039, 1064 (1995) (“The notion of 
guided discretion is destroyed and the goal of consistent results is unattainable if the 
sentencer’s discretion is guided with respect to aggravating circumstances but 
unlimited in granting mercy.”); Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 
3, at 384; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 360 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“The decision whether to impose the death penalty is a 
unitary one; unguided discretion not to impose is unguided discretion to impose as 
well.”). 
 181 Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal 
Sentencing, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 266 (arguing that “the Court’s broad conception of 
individualization—extending far beyond truly ‘mitigating’ factors (in terms of reducing 
moral culpability)—prevents states from developing any consistent theory of the goal or 
goals behind their capital statute; a defendant must be free to argue against the death 
penalty on the basis of any plausibly relevant consideration, including evidence of 
familial sympathy, good character traits, and future good behavior”). 
 182 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) (observing that “the power to 
be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate” (quoting K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY 
JUSTICE 170 (1973))). 
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who can receive a death sentence promotes consistency but 
jeopardizes fairness, and that prohibiting legislatures from 
limiting mitigation evidence promotes fairness but jeopardizes 
consistency, it might be tempting to conclude that one of these 
rules must go.  This would not be a novel conclusion; Justice 
Scalia, for one, has stated that because Lockett and Furman 
are “rationally irreconcilable,” and because Furman is 
connected less tangentially than Lockett to the original 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, he will “not vote to uphold 
an Eighth Amendment claim that the sentencer’s discretion 
has been unlawfully restricted.”183  
Such a solution, however, fails to solve the problem, 
because consistency requires fairness.  If a particular offender’s 
culpability is inaccurately determined, then not only will his 
sentence be unfair but consistency also will be diminished.  The 
death sentence of an offender who deserves a sentence of a 
term of imprisonment is unjust in two ways: it is unfair to him 
in an absolute, noncomparative sense because it is not 
commensurate with the wrongfulness of his acts and his 
culpability for those acts, and it is also inconsistent because it 
is more severe than the sentences received by offenders who 
neither are less culpable nor committed less wrongful acts.  
The same is true if the offender receives a sentence of a term of 
imprisonment when he deserves to be sentenced to death.  His 
sentence is unfair (to others if not to the offender himself)184 
  
 183 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see 
also Callins, 510 U.S. at 1141-42 (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“[T]his 
Court has attached to the imposition of the death penalty two quite incompatible sets 
of commands: The sentencer’s discretion to impose death must be closely confined, but 
the sentencer’s discretion not to impose death (to extend mercy) must be unlimited.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 184 Some scholars have proposed that an unfairly lenient sentence is a wrong 
against the offender, who has a “right to punishment.”  See Lloyd L. Weinreb, The 
Complete Idea of Justice, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 752, 758 n.14 (1984) (“Hegel, emphasizing 
that punishment responds to the aspect of wrongdoing, said that ‘punishment is 
regarded as containing the criminal’s right and hence by being punished he is 
honoured as a rational being.’” (quoting G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 71 (T. Knox 
trans. 1942))). 
  Here, “unfair” is used to mean “undeserved.”  The wrong created by 
imposing an unfairly lenient sentence is experienced if not by the offender himself then 
at least by others whose sentences are not so lenient.  See Richard S. Frase, 
Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 74 (2005) (“[U]niformity is based on 
concepts of fairness—fairness to other offenders (who could justly complain if this 
defendant received a lighter penalty for the same conduct), and fairness to the 
defendant (who could justly complain if he were punished more severely than other 
equally blameworthy offenders).”).  But see Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth 
Amendment Regulation of the Capital-Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 825 
(1998) (stating that this idea suffers from “profound irony”).  Recently, the topic of 
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because it is less severe than he deserves, and it is inconsistent 
with the more severe sentences received by other offenders who 
are equally culpable.  Consistency and fairness thus both 
require the same thing—that all offenders receive sentences 
that are neither more nor less severe than they deserve.185   
If the exclusions adopted in Atkins and Roper really did, 
as the Court conveyed, affect only those offenders who are less 
culpable than other offenders, then these decisions would 
promote both consistency and fairness.  But to the extent that 
Atkins and Roper exclude some offenders who are not 
necessarily less culpable than those offenders who remain 
included, these decisions advance neither of capital 
punishment’s sentencing goals.  Moreover, by failing to address 
the inequalities that Atkins and Roper might cause, the Court 
created an impression that the exclusions will only enhance 
fairness and consistency—an impression that may provide false 
comfort to those who do not oppose the death penalty in all 
instances but who nevertheless do care that this punishment is 
administered justly. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s contentions in Atkins 
and Roper, juvenile and mentally retarded offenders are not 
necessarily less culpable for their crimes than are non-juvenile 
and non-mentally retarded offenders.  Because juvenile and 
mentally retarded offenders are not necessarily less culpable, 
  
unfair leniency has been addressed in the context of considering whether mercy is 
consistent with fairness.  See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out?, supra 
note 135, at 864 (observing that “[d]iscrimination in the dispensation of mercy and 
discrimination in the imposition of death create exactly the same inequality problem in 
any given pool”).  Although mercy creates problems for consistency, it is worth noting 
that some clemency decisions enhance consistency.  For cases in which a clemency 
decision enhanced consistency, see Louis D. Bilonis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 1643, 1701 (1993) (“Ex-Marine Harold Glenn Williams’ death sentence was 
commuted by the Board due to concerns about the proportionality of the sentence. A 
codefendant who entered a plea agreement received only a ten-year sentence, despite 
having been the ‘ringleader’ of the murder.”); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy 
Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 627 (1991) 
(“I am impelled to commute the sentence of Ames to the same sentence received by his 
cohort not for any sympathy for Ames, but in order that it may not be said that Ohio 
failed in comparative justice.” (quoting former Ohio governor Thomas Herbert)). 
 185 Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong To Commute Death Row? Retribution, 
Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319, 1330 (2004) (“Like cases must be treated 
alike.  Justice and equality therefore work together.  If an offender receives the 
punishment he deserves, and if all those similarly situated receive the punishment 
they deserve, then each offender will not only have been treated justly, he will also 
have been treated equally compared to all those similarly situated.”). 
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categorically excluding them from capital punishment results 
in unjust treatment for similarly culpable non-juvenile and 
non-mentally retarded offenders.   
In Roper, the Supreme Court observed that “[b]ecause 
the death penalty is the most severe punishment, the Eighth 
Amendment applies to it with special force.”186  The Court in 
both Roper and Atkins seems to have forgotten, however, about 
the Eighth Amendment rights of those who are still subject to 
the death penalty, and also about its own prior commitment to 
the Eighth Amendment principle that capital punishment must 
be imposed fairly and consistently or not at all.187  The 
categorical exclusions adopted in Atkins and Roper make it 
easier to believe that the death penalty can indeed be imposed 
justly, but the real result of these decisions might well be that 
capital punishment is both less fair and less consistent.188 
  
 186 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
 187 See cases cited supra note 179. 
 188 The possibility that increased constraints on imposing the death penalty 
will make capital punishment only seem more fair has been suggested by many 
scholars.  See, e.g., Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and 
Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 77 
(2002) (“Is not there a risk that these reforms may lead to the worst of all worlds: the 
appearance of careful and fair review coupled with the practical certainty that relief 
will be denied each time?  This ‘legitimation effect’ is one of the most damaging aspects 
of the current death penalty review scheme.”); Joshua Herman, Comment, Death 
Denies Due Process: Evaluating Due Process Challenges to the Federal Death Penalty 
Act, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1777, 1889 (2004) (“If the general population is induced into 
believing that the capital punishment system is reliable because of legitimating 
reforms, wrongful capital convictions will continue to mount and the risks of wrongful 
convictions and executions will not subside.”); Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second 
Thoughts, supra note 3, at 436 (“[T]he elaborateness of the Court’s death penalty 
jurisprudence fuels the public’s impression that any death sentences that are imposed 
and finally upheld are the product of a rigorous—indeed, too rigorous—system of 
constraints.”); Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty’s Future: Charting the Crosscurrents 
of Declining Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1963 
(2006) (noting the risk that after Atkins and Roper, “the public may feel that the most 
unfair applications of the death penalty have been banished without realizing that 
more subtle but every bit as deadly problems can still persist” (footnote omitted)). 
